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Abstract: 
The purpose of this thesis is a valuation of DOF ASA with a thorough analysis of the offshore 
service market. The valuation is based on public available information up until November 2010, 
and discussions with CFO Hilde Drønnen at DOF ASA. The market analysis is based on reports 
and presentations obtained from various Norwegian investment houses that cover the offshore 
service and subsea market. We will compile and use them as input in a market model.  
The market analysis concludes that the OSV market is currently under pressure. Many OSVs 
where ordered during the economic upturn prior to the financial crisis and is now entering the 
market. Improvement in OSV market is not expected before late 2011. The outlook for the 
subsea market looks better, and with attrition of old subsea vessels, the subsea market should 
maintain high utilization. 
The valuation is performed using 3 valuation methods: The Discounted cash flow method, net 
asset value method, and a peer view analysis. The conclusion of our valuation arrives at a 
fundamental value of NOK 72 per share. With a discount based on low liquidity and a controlling 
shareholder our target share price is NOK 58. The target share price offers a 29% upside 
potential compared to today’s share price, and we conclude with a buy recommendation.      
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Preface 
Valuations are performed on a daily basis based on new information released to the market. 
Many methods can be applied to perform these valuations, and theory on what is the best 
methods vary. The purpose of this thesis is to apply some of the theories to perform a 
fundamental valuation. We have in cooperation with DOF agreed to analyze the underlying 
values in DOF ASA. They believe that the values of the company are not portrayed correctly in 
the market.   
We would therefore like to answer/research 2 questions: 
1. What is the underlying fundamental value of DOF, and how is the value reflected in 
today`s stock price? 
2. What are the prospects for the market and segments where DOF operates? 
The research questions are interesting questions because DOF is in a high growth phase which 
makes DOF difficult to analyze. It would be interesting to see if values that are displayed 
through the share price are valid based on underlying values. The results of our analysis will 
form a basis for investment decisions, and will be interesting reading for current and future 
investors, both share holders and creditors. A thorough market analysis might be interesting for 
investors who want to include offshore service into their existing portfolio. 
Organization of thesis 
Chapter 1 contains a description on DOF’s company profile and introduces readers to DOF’s 
corporate structure, their main operations, and DOF’s vessels. Classification of DOF`s fleet will 
be the basis for further discussion in our thesis. We will present a summary of DOF`s internal 
strengths.  
In chapter 2 we will address theories and methodology. Theory on market structure, freight rate 
mechanism and the relationship between futures prices and expected spot prices will be 
discussed. An outline of the methodology behind the offshore service market model that is used 
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in the thesis will be explained. Finally theory and discussions on valuation methods that will be 
used in the thesis will be addressed. 
Chapter 3 deals with the market model. Main factors that contribute to affect demand and 
supply of the offshore service sector will be addressed. The balance between demand and 
supply will be studied, and how investor sentiment affects the balance trough the supply side. It 
will give readers a good understanding on fundamentals in the market.  Compiled forecasts 
incorporated in the market model will form the basis for financial projections.  
A competitor analysis is performed in chapter 4 to illustrate how DOF differs or is equal to their 
Norwegian peers. We have limited our scope to only include Norwegian peers, due to the vast 
number of competitors worldwide. Differences in the fleet, strategy, and financials will be 
explored. We will show that DOF has competitive advantages, but most likely short term 
advantages.  
Chapter 5 cover DOF`s financials and will take readers through a discussion on historic profit & 
loss statements and the balance sheet. The discussion will form a basis for projections for the 
next 5 years. By combining chapter 3 and 4 with historical performance we have constructed a 
model for revenue projections. The model will be outlined in Appendix A.  
The projections on cash flow that we found in chapter 5 will be used in chapter 6 to perform a 
Discounted Cash Flow valuation. We will also perform a NAV valuation based on vessel values 
from the second hand market. In cases where vessel transactions are non-existing we will base 
values on newbuilding costs. A peer view valuation will compare DOF`s values with Norwegian 
peers. Finally we present scenarios that affect the outcome of the three valuation methods.  
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Abbreviations 
AHTS  Anchor Handling Tug Support Vessel 
AUV  Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
BBL  Barrels 
BHP  Break Horse Power 
CAPEX  Capital Expansion cost (investments) 
CAPM  Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CSV  Construction Support Vessel 
DCF  Discounted Cash Flow model 
DSV  Dive Support Vessel 
DWT  Deadweight Tonnage 
E&P  Exploration and Production 
EBITDA  Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization 
EV  Enterprise Value 
FPSO  Floating Production, Storage and Offload vessel 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GOM  Gulf of Mexico 
HQSE  Health, Quality, Safety and Environment 
LCP  Large Cap Players 
M&A  Merger and Acquisition 
MBOE  Thousands of Barrels of Oil Equivalent 
MMBOE Million Barrels of Oil Equivalent 
MSV  Multi Support Vessel 
MVD  Market Value of Debt 
MVE  Market Value of Equity 
NAV  Net Asset Value model 
NIBD  Net Interest Bearing Debt 
NIBOR  Norwegian Inter-Bank Offered Rate 
NOC  National Oil Companies 
NS  North Sea 
OCV  Offshore Construction vessel 
OPEX  Operating Expenses 
OSE  Oslo Stock Exchange 
OSV  Offshore Support Vessel 
OTC  Over The Counter 
P&L  Profit and Loss statement 
PLV  Pipe Lay Vessel 
PSV  Platform Support vessel 
ROV  Remotely Operated Vehicle 
ROVSV  Remotely Operated Vehicle Support Vessel 
ROTV  Remote Towed Vehicle 
RRR  Reserve Replacement ratio 
TC  Time Charter 
WACC  Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
WIV  Well Intervention Vessel 
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 1 DOF ASA - company profile
1.1 Introduction 
DOF ASA was founded in 1981 and today the company controls one of the largest and modern 
fleets among its Norwegian peers. None of the other
operators has the same subsea exposure. I
capacity to service the subsea market. 
DOF ASA is represented in all major regions where
achieve this, the company has a strong local presence in all 
offices, and a large multinational workforce of
DOF is in strong growth with many new
newbuildings and vessels operated by subsidiaries
operations will be given later in this
1.2 Structure 
DOF’s current company structure is complex compared to 
company structure is presented in figure 2
Figure 2-1: DOF ASA Company Structre 
Source: DOF ASA, compiled by authors 
Norskan 
(Brazilan Fleet)
100% owned/ 100% 
consolidated
DOF Supply 
(Norwegian Fleet)
50 – 100% owned / 100% 
consolidated
 
 Norwegian offshore service
n addition to operating vessels they offer
 
 global oil and gas industry operates. To 
of their operating regions with 
 about 3.100 employees. 
buildings. The fleet comprise of 68 vessels, 
. A detailed description of the fleet
 chapter. 
their Norwegian peers. The current 
-1.  
DOF ASA
Aker DOF 
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50% owned / 50% 
consolidated
DOF Subsea AS
51% owned / 100% 
consolidated
DOF Installer
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Subsea
100% owned/ 100% 
consolidated in DOF 
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DOF ASA is a holding company for the various subsidiaries presented. Subsea operations for 
DOF ASA are mainly handled by DOF Subsea AS, which is 51% owned. The remaining 49% is 
owned by the private equity group First Reserve. DOF Installer, with 3 large AHTSs under 
construction, is owned 67% by DOF Subsea AS, and the remaining shares are OTC listed on OSE. 
DOFSUB and DOF Installer are 100% consolidated into DOF Subsea AS which is 100% 
consolidated in DOF ASA.    
1.3 Operations 
DOF ASA operates in two business areas, offshore service and subsea. Offshore service 
operations charter platform supply vessels (PSV) and anchor handling tug supply vessels (AHTS) 
mainly on long-term contract with focus on the North Sea and Brazil regions. Contractors are 
mostly national oil companies and large cap oil and gas companies. 
Subsea vessels are chartered on long-term term charters (TC) or on a day-rate project contract. 
Project contracts are usually short term and rates corresponds to service provided day to day. 
Services can include remotely operated vehicle (ROV) and engineering capabilities like divers, 
ROV operators and geologists. TC contracts provide a fixed day rate which is index regulated 
often in line with the expected cost inflation. Most contracts have extended options added 
where charterers can choose to exercise options at predetermined terms. If rates decrease 
significantly, options will probably not be exercised.  
DOF has equipment to carry out large scale subsea operations and is in process of acquiring 
engineering skills and personnel to handle these operations. DOF recently acquired SWG 
Offshore, an Australian company serving the Asia Pacific region. SWG`s core business is project 
management and engineering.  
The main operating areas for DOF ASA are the North Sea, Brazil, West Africa, and South East 
Asia. Details on operating areas will be presented later in this chapter.    
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1.4 Fleet  
DOF operates as mentioned in the offshore service vessel market (OSV) and Subsea market. We 
will now present aspects of operations for the PSVs, AHTSs and Subsea vessels. 
The fleet composition of DOF ASA is presented in table 1-1. DOF has 51 vessels in operation and 
17 newbuildings. The vessels are scheduled to be delivered over the next 3 years.  
Table 1-1: DOF ASA fleet overview 
 
1.4.1 The Offshore Service Vessels 
Offshore Service Vessels (OSV) can be divided into PSV and AHTS. 
PSV 
Platform Supply Vessels (PSV) transport supplies to and from offshore installations. PSVs most 
important specification is large deck space and tanks under the deck which can carry different 
fluids in separate tanks. On deck PSVs can carry containers, equipment and pipes, while under 
deck the vessels can transport fluids like mud & brine, cements or other dry bulk, water and 
fuel. Some vessels have tanks for special fluids like methanol. 
Table 1-2: Classifications of PSVs 
 PSV’s are classified according 
to their carrying capacities: Size 
of free deck space, total 
 PSV AHTS ROV / OSCV / 
DSV / Seismic 
Total Of which are under 
construction 
DOF Supply 13 3 2 18 1 
Norskan Offshore Ltda 7 12 2 21 8 
DOF Subsea AS  0 0 21 21 3 
DOF Installer ASA 0 3 0 3 2 
Aker DOF Deepwater AS 0 5 0 5 5 
Total 
Contract Coverage 2010 (firm) 
Contract Coverage 2011 (firm) 
20 
98% 
68% 
23 
96% 
74% 
25 
91% 
66% 
68 
95% 
69% 
17 
 
 
Source: DOF ASA, compiled by authors 
 Small Medium Large 
Free deck space 
Dead weight ton (DWT) 
<400m2 
<2000 dwt 
400-800m2 
2000-3000 dwt 
>800m2 
>3000 dwt 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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carrying capacity in dead weight ton (DWT), or specifics of tanks. The most common 
classification is DWT. 
 
DOF operates 20 PSV’s including newbuildings, and vessels are in the medium to large range, 
most in the large range. All vessels are on long term contracts, even newbuildings.  
AHTS 
Anchor Handling Tug Supply (AHTS) vessels are especially designed for towing and anchoring of 
rigs and other offshore installations. Recent developments in the offshore market have showed 
that deepwater operations require the need for bigger engines and winches. To anchor a drilling 
rig or a floating production unit at high depths require more powerful engines. We can observe 
an increase in larger AHTSs being built in order to facilitate a safe and efficient operation for the 
oil companies.      
ATHS vessels are classified mainly according to their towing capacity. The most common 
yardstick is break horse power (BHP), but also winch power and supply operational capabilities  
Table 1-3: Classification of AHTS  
DOF owns 23 AHTS’s including 
newbuildings, and all vessels are 
in the medium to large range, 
mostly in large. Two of DOF`s newest vessels under construction in Brazil have 31 000 BHP, 
which is among the largest in the world. Some of the AHTSs are very large and have huge 
cranes, and can operate as construction support vessels. Most of DOF`s AHTS fleet is on long 
term contracts with major contractors.  
1.4.2 Subsea vessels 
Subsea vessel is a common term for offshore construction vessels (OCV) and construction 
support vessels (CSV). Subsea vessels main operations include installation, inspection and 
maintenance of subsea equipment for the oil and gas industry. They also service offshore 
platforms and buoys. Specialized vessels handle operations like pipe-laying, installations of 
mooring systems, construction and removal of offshore installations. Subsea vessels are large 
 Small Medium Large 
Break horse power(BHP) <10 000 10 000 – 15 000 >15 000 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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vessels with huge cranes and large deck space to transport equipment. Many of the vessels 
have ROV and diving capabilities. 
DOF’s subsea vessels can be divided into Multi Support Vessels (MSV), Dive Support Vessels 
(DSV), Survey vessels, and Well Intervention Vessels (WIV). MSV is a general term that covers 
vessels which can install medium to lightweight subsea equipment, and also operate ROVs. DSVs 
have dive capabilities through on-board saturation diving chambers. Survey vessels perform 
seismic and survey operations, mapping the seabed for subsea installations and pipeline routes.  
Table 1-4: Classification of DOF`s subsea fleet 
DOF also owns two well-intervention vessels, Skandi 
Aker and Santos, which are the only vessels in the world 
that can conduct offshore testing and installations of 
subsea installations (DOF Q2 2010). Table 1-4 illustrate 
the classification of DOF`s subsea fleet and the vessels 
associated equipment.  
 
 
DOF charters vessels with marine crew to major contractors on long-term contracts. They also 
have engineering capabilities, through DOFSUB, offering vessels with full crew and equipment 
directly to the oil companies. In connection with offshore construction work, DOF can use their 
whole operations specter since the AHTS vessels and PSVs provide support duties and towing 
assistance.     
  
DOF’s subsea fleet 
(incl. new builds) 
Vessels: 
MSV/ROVSV 
DSV 
Well-intervention 
Seismic/Survey 
 
15 
6 
2 
4 
Equipment: 
ROVs 
ROTVs 
AUV 
 
40 
2 
1 
Source: DOF Q2 2010, Compiled by authors 
 Ch
ap
te
r:
 1
 
D
O
F 
AS
A 
- c
om
pa
ny
 p
ro
fil
e 
1
1 
 
1.5 Areas of operations 
The offshore service and subsea market will be addressed in the market analysis in chapter 3. 
DOF’s areas of operations are presented below.   
1.5.1 Northwest Europe 
The North Sea region is a mature market with many oil and gas installations in place. Few large 
projects are under construction, except for Stockhman which is in a planning and survey phase. 
The region is today one of the largest OSV markets in the world with an average of around 200 
vessels, and many operators charter on spot.  
DOF operates 12 PSVs and 2 AHTSs on long-term contract in the North Sea, and one PSV on 
spot. The company has therefore very little spot exposure, and contract renewals are not 
needed before end 2011. DOF used to operate more vessels in the North Sea region, but has 
transferred vessels to Brazil to service the national oil company Petrobras. Brazil is an area in 
high growth compared to the North Sea. 
1.5.2 Brazil 
DOF has operated in Brazil for 10 years with a good track record. DOF’s wholly-owned Norskan 
has a leading position in Brazil with the largest owned OSV and subsea fleet.   
Most oil and gas discoveries in Brazil are at very high depths where fields are around 3 times 
further from shore than in the North Sea region.  Brazil’s oil and gas industry is in very high 
growth and Petrobras is expected to double its production levels offshore by 2020, which 
indicates an annual growth of 7.1 % (DN 09.09.2010). The growth in exploration and production 
will increase the need for OSVs and subsea vessels.  
Special regulations in Brazil apply to OSV and subsea operations. The Brazilian government is 
committed to develop Brazil through local content by instituting favorable policies for those 
who commit to the country’s growth. The local content involves giving priority to Brazilian 
flagged vessels over foreign flagged vessels. Foreign flagged vessels under operation in Brazil 
need to undergo circularization every year which implies that contracts can be taken over by 
Brazilian flagged vessels, if available. At end Q2 2010 there were 93 OSV vessels under Brazilian 
 Ch
ap
te
r:
 1
 
D
O
F 
AS
A 
- c
om
pa
ny
 p
ro
fil
e 
1
2 
 
flag and 151 under foreign flag. DOF has 17 of 27 vessels operating in Brazil under Brazilian flag. 
To increase the number of vessels operating under Brazilian flag, a special Brazilian regime (REB) 
will allow for each vessel ton owned by a Brazilian registered shipping company to import one 
half of additional tons to operate under REB regime. In addition, for each vessel ton under 
construction, twice the vessel tonnage of the same type of vessel are allowed under the REB 
regime during construction period (DOF Q2 2010).  
1.5.3 Asia-Pacific region 
DOF have operated in the Asia-Pacific region the last 6 years and has increased their presence 
over the years. The market is fairly new like the Brazil region, and major oil and gas projects are 
in a development phase. DOF operates 4 subsea vessels in the region.  
1.5.4 West Africa 
Many new deepwater fields have been discovered In West Africa. Development of fields in the 
region will require subsea installations and DOF has been operating in the region for some time 
to perform project work. West Africa is unstable with political unrest, rebels and piracy.  
1.6 Internal summary 
DOF’s internal strengths lie with their employees which are shown through their strong track 
record. DOF has crew and engineers that are highly qualified, and have through acquisition of 
SWG Offshore acquired management knowledge of subsea operations. Combining this with new 
and high quality vessels and equipment, DOF will have a strong position for future growth.  DOF 
has a strong global presence with office locations in all operating areas which bring them closer 
to charterers and strengthen bonds.  
DOF`s company structure is large and complex which can imply a relative large management 
organization. Their local presence in operating areas might lead to high management costs, but 
the costs must be viewed in context with the benefits from presence in the regions. 
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2 Theory and methodology 
2.1 The market analysis 
Theory on the offshore service industry and the subsea industry is hard to come by. Theory on 
the shipping industry and different aspects that affect the industry is more common. Offshore 
service and subsea are industries which have developed in later years in line with the offshore 
production of oil and gas. First the oil and gas companies had integrated offshore services and 
subsea services for their installations, but this have now been outsourced to improve efficiency. 
The offshore service industry and subsea industry were created. 
A common practice for a strategic analysis is to perform an analysis using the well known Porter 
model for external analysis and VRIO model for internal. We will address the same issues that 
these models deal with, but in a different approach. The external analysis will be highlighted 
through the market model in chapter 3 and we will address the differences amongst the 
Norwegian peers with a competitor analysis in chapter 4. Internal values are highlighted in 
chapter 1.6. 
For the market model we first thought of using Stopford`s 9 step model, but the model is 
generalized around tanker and bulk shipping. Instead we have adjusted a macroeconomic 
shipping model and an overview of the model is presented in chapter 2.1.4. We will use market 
reports obtained from various financial institutions, and form a consensus on how the market is 
expected to develop in the next five years in chapter 3.  
2.1.1 Market structure: 
The market structure in the offshore service industry and subsea industry is important to 
understand because the market structure influence competition and prices in the short and long 
run. A perfect competition situation refers to a market where no producers or consumers are 
large enough to affect prices (Samuelson and Nordhus 2005). A monopoly situation is the polar 
structure to perfect competition where one seller has complete control over the industry. One 
firm produces all the products or services for the industry. Market structure in a monopoly is 
the most imperfect structure. 
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It is common for an industry to have a market structure in between the two polar structures 
(Pugel 2009). Some degree of imperfect competition is expected in most industries today. 
Monopolistic competition occurs when a large number of buyers and sellers are operating in the 
market, but the products/services are differentiated. In a perfect competitive structure the 
products/services are homogeneous. Oligopoly situation is a structure with few sellers who 
dominate the market. Companies in an oligopoly have high barriers of entry and substantial 
economies of scale. The structure is a stronger form of imperfect competition. Characteristics 
for different market structures are listed in figure 2-1.  
Prices in a perfect competition situation are equal to the marginal cost (P=MC). In a monopoly 
the prices are where marginal revenue equals marginal cost (MR=MC). In imperfect competition 
the prices are somewhere in between the prices in perfect competition and monopoly. 
Figure 2-1: Characteristics for different market structure 
 
  
 
Source: Course lectures BUS 401 , Adjusted by authors 
Perfect competition:
-Many buyer and 
sellers
-No barriers of entry 
or exit
-Identical 
product/service
Symetric information
Profitmaximization
Monopolistic 
competition:
-Many buyer and 
sellers
-No barriers of entry 
or exit
Differentiated 
product/services
Oligopoly:
-Few seller
-High barriers of entry 
or exit
-Identical or 
differentiated product/ 
service
Mutual dependentcy
Monopoly:
-One seller
-Very high barriers of 
entry or exit
Perfect competition
Imperfect competition
Monopoly
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2.1.2 The Freight Rate Mechanism 
Figure 2-2: The Freight Rate Mechanism 
The green line in figure 2-2 
illustrates the supply curve for 
ordinary shipping and the black 
line illustrates the supply curve 
for offshore service. The supply 
curves for ordinary shipping 
(inter-regional cargo) and 
offshore service are different.  
Supply in ordinary shipping can be 
affected in the short term by adjusting speed, moving vessels in and out of lay-up and scarping. 
Maximum supply is almost constant in short term, because it takes time to deliver a new vessel, 
illustrated by the green and black supply curves. The demand curve is almost vertical and 
represents how the charterers adjust to price changes, illustrated by the red line. 
The demand and supply curves can be applied to most shipping markets, but the relationship is 
different for the OSV market. “The practical reasons are that the weather often is not good 
enough for high speed, the difference between economical and high speed is low and the 
relevant travelling distances are usually short. This makes the time gain very modest combined 
with the fact that a few minutes gained or lost usually does not matter much”( Aas 2009).   
It is difficult to affect supply with the speed element for offshore service. However in Brazil the 
offshore installations are further from land, up to 3 times longer than in the North Sea which 
might increase the relevance. The economical speed for the most modern vessels is around 11-
13 knots, and the maximum speed is usually around 17-18 knots. To speed up will represent an 
increase in the cost of fuel. The speed difference represents flexibility, but flexibility is not 
always possible due to harsh weather conditions (Aas 2009). The black line in figure 2-2 
illustrates a possible supply curve which is less convex due to less flexibility. Demand for 
offshore service shown in figure 2-2 is almost vertical. It correspond to that oil companies need 
 
Source: Stopford 2009, adjusted by authors 
Ton miles per period
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offshore service whether costs are high or low and that there is no alternative transport of 
offshore service than shipping (Stopford 2009).  
At equilibrium the charterers and vessel owners agree on a price. If there is a shift in the 
demand curve to the right, we get a new intersection point, and we see from figure 2-2 that the 
supply curve is steeper for ordinary shipping and nearly unchanged for offshore service. The 
new equilibrium will attribute to a higher freight rate and more ton miles pr period for ordinary 
shipping while for offshore service there is limited affect on “freight rates”. We assume that 
ordinary shipping companies and offshore service companies have excess supply capacity. 
Vessels will come out of lay-up as the increased freight rate will make it possible for the older 
vessels to support higher operation costs.  
The long term equilibrium effect on supply is decided by the fleet size. Demand decides if the 
fleet will grow with new buildings or decrease with scraping.     
2.1.3 Futures prices versus expected spot prices 
Futures prices are forecasted prices on future spot prices. To explain how well futures prices 
forecast future spot prices there have been put forward three hypotheses (Bodie et al. 2008). 
1. The expectation hypotheses: 
The hypotheses rely on risk neutrality where all participants are risk neutral. The 
participants agree on a price that provides an expected profit equal to zero for all 
parties. The hypotheses states that the future prices are equal to expected value of 
spot price at a given, future time. F0 = E(PT) 
2. Normal backwardation: 
Offshore service companies want to hedge against risk and take short position1 to 
guarantee services for a given price. To get speculators to take the corresponding 
long position2 the offshore service companies need to offer the speculators an 
expectation of profit. Speculators will only go long if the futures price is below the 
                                                          
1 Short position = Sell position at time zero 
2 Long position = Buy position at time zero 
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expected spot price. Speculators make a profit equal to E(PT) – F0 and offshore 
service companies loose the same amount, and eliminate all price risk. 
3. Contango: 
Contango is the polar hypotheses to backwardation. The hypotheses state that it is 
purchasers (oil companies) of offshore services that want to hedge. Oil companies 
would be willing to pay a premium to lock the price they must pay for offshore 
services. Oil companies take a long position in the futures market and speculators 
take the short position. Long hedgers are willing to pay a higher futures price and 
speculators bear the risk, and must be paid a premium for entering in the short 
position. F0 have to be higher than E(PT) for the contango hypotheses to hold. 
The relationship between futures prices and expected spot prices can be used to explain the 
relationship between spot day-rates and term day-rates for offshore services. 
Spot day-rates are prices offshore service companies get for services with instant delivery for a 
short given period. Services include use of different vessels with different specifications. Term 
day-rates are prices offshore service companies get for services in agreement with oil 
companies over a longer time period, or a future time period. Term day-rates are forecasted 
spot day-rates. Hence we can interpret the development in rates like the development in 
futures (Hannesson 2010). 
Figure 2-3 illustrates the development in prices.  At time zero the spot day-rate is equal to the 
term day-rate. The term day-rate can differ from the expected normal spot day-rate, over or 
under. As we move into time the spot day-rates are expected to follow the term day-rates as 
shown in the figure below.  
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Figure 2-3: Spot day-rates and term day-rates 
Term day-rates will move 
towards expected long run 
spot day-rates which 
reflect long term offshore 
service cost for the oil 
companies. Term day-
rates are therefore 
reflecting future spot 
rates. We will return to 
offshore service cost in 
chapter 3.  
2.1.4 The market model 
There is not much theory on the offshore service market. We will therefore use a classic 
maritime supply-demand model which is called “The macroeconomic shipping model” as a 
skeleton (Stopford 2009). We will adjust the model to fit the offshore service market. The 
Market analysis model separates the market into 3 sections; demand, supply and the balance 
between the two. We will use reports from investment houses and come to a 
consensus/understanding of different aspects that we will use in the model.  
1. The demand section will be highlighted by a top-down approach which starts with the 
world economy and down to ship demand for different segments within the offshore 
service industry and subsea industry. We will look at factors and relationships which is 
important to give an understanding of the development of ship demand, and compile 
forecasts for future years. 
2. In the supply section we want to derive the total existing fleet for offshore service and 
subsea operations. The section will also discuss factors and relationships that we want to 
address; scrapping and newbuildings determines the size of the fleet, but we will also 
discuss the subjectivity from an investor`s perspective. The investor`s sentiment is 
 
Source: Hannesson 2010, adjusted by authors 
Expected Spot 
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Term day-
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Spot day-rates
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dependent on the balance between demand and supply, but the investor can only affect 
the supply of vessels. We will look at historic and forecasted supply for vessels.  
3. The balance between demand and supply determines utilization, rates and asset prices 
for vessels. If there is oversupply of vessels, these determinants will drop and the other 
way around. In this section we will reach a forecast based on the market reports from 
the investment houses and later implement the forecasts in our valuation. 
The ordinary shipping industry differs from the offshore service and subsea sectors. Vessel 
owners and charterers come to an agreement on rates based on market balance in both cases. 
For ordinary shipping the vessel owners can use the freight rate mechanism discussed earlier to 
use an optimal economic speed to reduce operating cost in bad times and exploit god times.  
2.2 Valuation models 
Valuation models use a market and competitor analysis to create a base line for future 
projections on cash flows. When valuing a company, basing estimates on the market outlook 
and the company’s current strategic position we will arrive at a fundamental value of the 
company. The value may differ substantially from the current stock price, if listed, but will serve 
as an indicator of what the company should be worth if the projections are correct. The 
fundamental value might never be reached if the stock has low liquidity or few shareholder 
control the company.   
There are various methods to perform a valuation of a company. The method must be adapted 
according to type of company and sector of the valuation target. There are three main methods 
for valuation. Fundamental valuation, comparative valuation and option based valuation (Koller 
et al. 2005).   
There are two main approaches to fundamental valuation. Cash flow models and asset models. 
Cash flow models base the value of the company on the present value of cash flows generated 
by the company over its lifetime. Asset models base the value of a company on current market 
values of the company’s assets. We will use the discounted cash flow model and a net asset 
value approach when performing our fundamental valuation. 
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Comparative valuation is used to compare key financial figures of a company to its competitors 
and the sector. We will perform a peer view analysis of DOF and their Norwegian peers. 
We will not conduct an option based valuation because it is highly complex and is highly 
subjective to errors. The valuation methods we use is the most common methods for shipping 
companies (Dahl et al. 1997). 
2.2.1 Discounted Cash Flow model 
The discounted cash flow (DCF) model is the most recognized and used model in valuation 
today. The basis for the model is to discount future cash flows based on future expectation. The 
valuation method takes direct consideration to uncertainty through the discount rate or the 
cash flow assumptions. Information on historical cash flows can contribute to reduce the 
uncertainty in the assumptions on future cash flows, and contribute to a more correct valuation 
of the company.  
Differences in financing and depreciation will often affect accounting from year to year and will 
therefore be difficult to estimate. We will start by looking at earnings before Interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) numbers. We adjust the EBITDA numbers by removing 
abnormal items, as one offs, to get a more correct presentation of historic performance. Capital 
structure will be taken care of in the discount rate. We also have to consider capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) and changes in net working capital (Kinserdal 2010).  
Cash flow from operations shows what the 
operational activities have generated over a period 
of time. Cash flow to investments shows what is 
paid for investments less sale of assets. We also 
have to consider the change in net working capital, 
which show how much capital is reserved for daily 
operations.  
When we have calculated the free cash flow for operations, we will discount the cash flows to 
take the value of money over time into consideration. We do that with a weighted average cost 
   Cash flow from operations  
– Cash flow to investments 
 = Free cash flow from operations 
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of capital (WACC). When using WACC, we do not have to consider how the company is financed, 
i.e. in the calculation of free cash flows we do not include financial items.   
By discounting with a WACC rate we will arrive at the Enterprise Value. The net interest bearing 
debt is deducted to find the market cap of the company.  
Limitations with DCF lies in the assumptions one uses. Assumptions can impact the outcome of 
the valuation significantly. With the DCF model one will calculate a terminal value at the end of 
the projection period. This is done since there is very much uncertainty after 5 years, and this 
value will usually count for a very large part of the Enterprise Value, usually around 50 – 70%. It 
is therefore very important that the assumptions on the long term growth and WACC are 
correct. 
Other limitations include the use of the discount rate, WACC, which assumes that market values 
should be used.  
    	 
     	 
 	

  
Where RE is the return on equity derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), RD is the 
cost of debt, tC is the corporate tax, EV is the Enterprise Value, MVE is the Market Value of 
Equity, and MVD is the Market Value of Debt. To find the market values of debt we usually use 
values equal to book values. The problem occurs when we are to find the market value of 
equity, and hence the Enterprise Value (EV=MVE+MVD).  This is what we want to arrive at with 
the model. A discussion on how we solved this problem one can find in chapter 6.1.1 where we 
outline the values for WACC.   
WACC also suppose that there is a fixed capital structure. This implies that the cost of equity 
varies. 

     	   
 	    
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The financial risk decrease with the repayment of the debt and opposite, but we suppose that 
that there is constant business risk, i.e. no debt tax effects. We see that by changing the debt 
ratio, the cost of equity will change since all other parameters will be constant.  
2.2.2 Net Asset Value 
Net asset value (NAV) is a valuation method much used when valuating shipping companies. 
NAV is defined as the market value of the assets, less the market value of the debt. When 
applying this method the real value of each asset will be estimated as if it they were to be sold 
of one by one. The difference between this model and a liquidation model is that this model 
assumes that it is a going concern.  
The value of a vessel should represent the potential cash flow that 
the vessel could generate over its lifetime. The general life 
expectancy for the vessels in this sector is usually 30 years. To predict 
the potential cash flow generated is almost impossible, and one 
usually have to base the projections on sales and purchases in the 
second hand markets.   
It is often quite difficult to get these values since it requires a liquid 
second hand market. This is also a problem with the vessels operating in DOF’s markets. The 
market of OSV and subsea is relatively new compared to other shipping sectors, and there is 
little re-sale of vessels. There is though a lot of new building for this sector.    
Another problem is that these vessels are not homogeneous; they have different specifications 
that could make the values differ substantially. We have learned that when this is the case like 
for DOF’s Skandi Aker, they will be valued at their building cost.  
We will make use of second hand transaction values obtained for various vessel designs that 
DOF owns, and adjust values according to specifications like age, engine and size. The method 
can be applied for the OSV fleet, but due to lack of vessel transactions in the subsea market we 
will have to use another approach for DOF`s subsea vessels. We have obtained newbuilding cost 
for different types of subsea vessels and will value the subsea vessels at building costs. DOF 
NAV valuation 
 Vessel value 
+ Working capital 
+ Cash 
+ Other assets 
= 
 
 
+ 
+ 
=  
Total assets 
 
Interest bearing debt 
Remaining CAPEX 
Minorities 
Total Liabilities 
 Net Asset Value 
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recently released own projections on the value of the vessels, and we will compare these values 
to our projections, and also the projections from various investment banks.   
Historically there has been a discount to NAV (share price relative to NAV pr share), and we will 
try to analyze the reasons for this, and also look at what we can expect in the future.  
Limitations with the use of this model will be that it will give the NAV for today, but will not take 
into account the uncertainty of the future. The value of the vessels will swing in line with the 
rest of the world economy and the balance between demand and supply. 
2.2.3 Peer view 
The uses of multiples in valuation are today widely used because they are less time consuming 
and more cost effective. Peer view analysis is used to compare a company’s multiples against a 
comparable competitor (Koller et al. 2005). If used properly this valuation method can indicate if 
a company is mispriced, since there is usually no reason why a company should be priced much 
higher or lower than the peer group average. Combined with other models like DCF, the 
multiple approach can test the 
plausibility of assumptions to the end 
result.    
First we find the peer group multiple by 
using the market values. For example if 
we use the multiple P/E (price per share/earnings per share for sector) and multiply by the 
scaling factor (earnings per share of target company), we get the value of the company (V0). 
We can divide multiples into two groups (Dyrnes 2004): 
1. Starting point is price per share or market cap of the equity. These are often called 
equity multiples and are recognized by the denominator in the fraction is price (P). 
2. Starting point in the sum of market values of both equity and net interest bearing debt. 
These are called total asset multiples and are recognized by the denominator in the 
fraction is enterprise value (EV). 
        	    
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When using multiples in valuation one has to be careful. First it is very important to identify 
comparable companies. Differences in capital structures and financial accounting will impact the 
multiples and can lead to a misleading outcome. For example the use of the well known 
price/earnings multiple, will display issues. For instance the difference in capital structure and 
the depreciation will impact the earnings per share. Therefore it is quite difficult to find a 
competitor one can compare too.   
2.2.4 Simulation models 
The use of simulation models is a great way to analyze a mathematical problem that is to 
complex and difficult to reproduce. The Monte Carlo simulation model can be of good support 
to try out uncertainties to our analysis. The model randomly generates values for uncertain 
variable over and over based on predefined probability distributions (Mun 2003).  
With the DCF model and NAV valuation there are great uncertainty to the assumptions, and the 
model will produce a result based on the inputs that you define. By running a simulation, you 
can define crucial inputs to the DCF model, like OPEX and the discount rate, and run a scenario 
analysis. The simulation will repeatedly pick values from the probability distribution and 
produce different scenarios. The model will produce results based on the causalities, 
correlations and interrelationships of the variables defined in the model.  
We arrive at a range of probable results which will be weighted based on their distribution. The 
results received here can help to show the robustness of the result achieved from the standard 
DCF model.  
The model is not perfect, since there is assumption on inputs. The probability distribution we 
set for the variables will have a mean and standard deviation from the mean. The strength of 
the analysis is then based on finding a reasonable mean and a reasonable deviation from the 
mean. 
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3 The Market 
When looking at the market we adjusted Stopford`s macroeconomic shipping model to the 
offshore supply and subsea market (Stopford 2009). The model illustrated in figure 3-1 is a 
skeleton where the thick arrows show the relationship between variables. The thin arrows show 
elements of the variables worth analyzing and the stapled arrows link the balance between 
demand and supply with the subjectivity of the investor. We do not use the model as a 
numerical forecast model since we would have to touch the area of econometrics, and complex 
equations are then implied. We use the model to analyze the OSV and subsea market which are 
the markets where DOF operates. We will discuss the markets current state and compile the 
latest reports from ODS-Petrodata, Carnegie, Arctic Securities, RS Platou and DnB NOR Markets, 
and use as input to the model. The model will give us an understanding of the market in which 
DOF operates and the prospect of the two markets and different segments within. 
Figure 3-1: Offshore Service Market Model  
 
Source: Stopford 2009, adjusted by authors 
World economy
Regional markets
Shocks
Oil market 
fundamentals and 
E&P spendingOffshore service cost Tecnology
Ship Demand
Balance
Ratio and 
utilization
Asset pricesFreight market
Attrition/scrapping Newbuildings
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Fleet age
Ship Supply
Regional development
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3.1 Ship Demand 
Demand for vessels in the offshore service and subsea industry depends on various elements 
which we will discuss in this chapter. We will perform a top-down approach and first discuss the 
world economy and elements affecting world economy like regional development and shocks. 
Secondly we move toward oil market fundamentals and implement the elements offshore 
service cost and technology. Finally we discuss demand for different segments in which DOF 
operates. 
In our market analysis we have focused on the high end segments since DOF and their   
Norwegian peers operates in this segment. We will separate out the high end development 
from the total development to give a more suitable analysis. 
3.1.1 World economy 
There is limited amount of oil I the world, 50% of the oil production today comes from 100 
offshore and onshore fields, which are mostly old fields. 75% of the large fields have a declining 
production rate. The other half comes from 75,000 fields. Oil and gas have a given supply of 
unknown magnitude and costs are very high to find out about supply of oil and gas. These facts 
influence the supply curve and price formation (Hannesson 1998). Due to scarcity, the oil and 
gas market acts differently than standard markets. With standard markets we mean a supply 
function with a constant linear growth rate. The theory behind the supply function for oil and 
gas is discussed in chapter 2.1.2.  
In general the production of oil and gas fields has three phases (Hannesson 1998). First a rapidly 
growing production phase. Then comes a plateau phase which is economical optimal, and finally 
an exponential declining phase due to declining pressure in the fields. Conservatively the 
worldwide annual decline rate in existing production is 4.7% (DnB NOR Markets 2010). 
Deepwater fields have an annual decline rate of 18% and shallow water fields have an annual 
decline rate of 10%. Also there have been very few new large discoveries in recent years. This 
has lead to a focus towards exploration and production (E&P) of oil and gas which has a higher 
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cost of production, known as unconventional oil and gas. We will in chapter 3.1.2 discuss the 
important replacement recovery rate (RRR). 
Figure 3-2: Global oil demand and GDP growth 
 
Global oil demand and GDP growth are correlated. It is therefore worth discussing GDP growth 
when we look at oil market fundamentals. The graph on the left in figure 3-2 illustrates the 
correlated development. The recent recession in 2008 and 2009 resulted in a negative growth 
rate for GDP and oil demand. The figure on the right show forecasted GDP growth from 
different sources. GDP is expected to have a growth rate in 2010 and onwards similar to levels 
before the recession. 
Demand is dependent on the development in the world economy. Developing countries, 
especially China and India experience high growth in their economy and have contributed to 
much of the high demand for oil and gas. Development in the world economy is referred to as 
overall market conditions.   
Regional development 
Northwest Europe 
The North Sea (NS) is an open mature offshore oil production region. Oil production in the NS 
reached its peak around the year 2000 and is now in a decreasing phase. The decline in 
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production is because there have not been any large new discoveries since the big finds in the 
60ies. Learning about the fields and enhanced oil recovery through technological improvement 
has increased recoverable reserves. The decline phase would otherwise have happened many 
years before year 2000 (Hannesson 2010).    
The NS is the only well functional spot market in the world. The region is mature and has a large 
share of fixed installations, which explain why the market consists mainly of PSV and AHTS. 
Normally spot day-rates for the NS are an indicator for international rates. International term 
day-rates have not followed the decline in rates we can see in the NS to the same extent. A 
probable reason for different developments in rates can be the large numbers of newbuilds 
entering the NS market. Vessels without contracts are, if not put in lay-up or scarped, deployed 
in the NS spot market. Recently Statoil, which is the main producer of oil and gas in the North 
Sea, stated that they will focus on cost control (NRK online 27.9.2010). This relates to declining 
production, and they have to produce from smaller fields. For production to be economically 
viable Statoil need to reduce costs. How this will affect the North Sea rates is uncertain, but it 
indicates a decrease in rates for offshore service companies in the NS region.  
According to Arctic Securities, many OSV operators have exposure to the NS spot market to 
exploit strong rates when the market spikes. Due to weather conditions and season dependent 
travel, the rates are extremely volatile. Since December 08 there have been few spikes or short 
term tightness due to overall market conditions. Arctic securities expect the spot market in the 
NS to improve in line with the overall expected market conditions.  
DnB NOR markets are not that optimistic. They believe that the offshore service market will be 
redundant due to a large number of newbuilds that will enter the market, and that the outlook 
for daily rates to remain relatively low in the next three years, but with an upward trend. 
Carnegie comment that the NS has improved, but recently the number of rigs operating is down 
slightly. This can be seen through the day-rates for PSV and AHTS. 
The demand for midrange AHTS vessels (10-14,999 BHP) has been steadily decreasing the last 
years with an annual decline rate of 9.1%. The demand was 15 vessels in 2005, 10 vessels in 
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2009 and is expected to decrease to 7 vessels by 2013. The demand for high end AHTS vessels 
(15,000+ BHP) has grown slightly the last years with 17 vessels in 2005, 22 vessels in 2009 and 
estimated 24 vessels by 2013. The annual growth rate is 4.4%. The demand for high end PSVs 
(3,000+ DWT) has been increasing with an annual growth rate of 5.3%, from 93 vessels in 2005 
and 135 in 2009 to an estimated 141 in 2013 (DnB NOR Markets 2010).  
North and South America  
South America has become more popular among the oil and gas companies since 2007 due to 
large discoveries outside Brazil. Petrobras has announced an aggressive spending program. The 
Basin, Tupi and Campos fields has a proven reserve of more than 5,000 mmboe3. The region is in 
ultra deepwater, in the range 1,000 – 2,500 meters and has challenges such as large salt layer. 
The natural resources are 5-7,000 meters beneath the seabed (DnB NOR Markets 2010).  
Brazil has an aggressive activity growth and will increase production from 2.5mboe/d in 2009 to 
5.7mboe/d4 by 2020 (Arctic Securities 2010). Petrobras will be a significant driver for the OSV 
market. The area outside Brazil is far from shore (3x North Sea) and in very deep water. These 
two elements contribute to increased demand for the high end OSV market. Offshore Brazil is 
an open market with local content. State-owned Petrobras and a privately held oil company 
OGX operating in Brazil will contribute to an increase in demand for offshore service and subsea 
vessels. The oil field outside Brazil is in a development phase and has therefore the need for 
subsea vessels to service Petrobras and OGX in the construction of the fields.  
Demand for high end vessels in Brazil has been increasing every year except for 2010. Demand 
for midrange and high end AHTS vessels (10,000+ BHP), and high end PSVs (3,000+ DWT) has 
grown from 61 vessels in 2005 to an estimated 156 vessels in 2013 (Arctic Securities 2010).  
The Gulf of Mexico 
The accident in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) April 20 put in place a moratorium on deepwater 
drilling May 30 and was going to last until November 30. The moratorium was for exploratory 
                                                          
3 mmboe=Million Barrels of Oil Equivalents 
4 mboe = Thousand Barrels of Oil Equivalents 
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wells and put a halt on 33 exploratory wells. The moratorium was also for wells deeper than 500 
feet (Offshore Magazine 1.10.2010). The moratorium was lifted October 12 which is earlier than 
planned, but deepwater drilling is not expected to start before late 2011. That is because 
companies are now faced with new tougher safety regulations. Companies must satisfy the new 
regulations on safety and rigs must pass Bureau of Ocean Energy, Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement inspections before permits are given and drilling can start (Platts 2.11.2010). 
The US government has released two new regulations (Offshore magazine 1.10.2010). The new 
drilling safety rule and the workplace safety rule, and more regulations are expected. New 
regulations will impact the cost of operating in GoM. The regulations will probably be 
implemented in other regions as well to prevent similar accidents. That means that offshore 
service and subsea operations will be affected by the regulations.  
Asia-Pacific 
National Oil Companies (NOCs) and Majors (Large caps) are continuing the search to replace 
reserves in the Asia-Pacific region. The region has demanded more and more high end vessels 
for exploration and production (E&P), but there is oversupply and the demand has a low growth 
rate. Expected annual demand growth is 2.3%, 2.8% and 2.1% for the period 2011-2013 (DnB 
NOR Markets 2010).  
Oversupply in the region will continue because of the high number of deliveries. Approximately 
8-10 vessels are being delivered into South East Asia every month and there is strong 
competition on the contracts. The power of the market favors the charterers. Demand in 
Australia is better because of higher demand and the strong trade union laws that protect the 
market. The strong union laws favor local workers through a “heads of agreement” between the 
Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) and all major offshore employers. The agreement provides a 
30% pay increase from 2010 to 2013 (Direct Action 20.3.2010). Day-rates in Australia are higher 
than the overall market and are expected to be so in the future.  
West Africa 
West Africa is a region with governing challenges and political unrest. Promising areas for future 
expansion of offshore oil and gas activities are located outside the shores of Angola, Ghana, 
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Nigeria and The Republic of Cote d`Ivoire. Militant groups, piracy and other rebels are a problem 
for these countries. The outlook for the region is expected to improve which can lead to an 
increase of rigs being used, and an increase in offshore service and subsea vessels.  
Random shocks 
Macroeconomic shocks have occurred in the market and will happen again. Shocks affect the oil 
price which is the most important determinant for E&P spending. From figure 3-3 we can clearly 
see the effects the two OPEC crises in 1973 and 1979 had on the oil price. 9/11 and the 
problems with the US currency contributed to the oil price increase in this century. The 
dynamics that affects the oil price is continuously changing, but there are some elements which 
are important. Elements which can lead to a rise in the oil price are strong underlying demand 
from non OPEC countries, lower growth in supply, low spare capacity, a weaker dollar and 
mismatch between capacity in refining and demand for oil (IEA 2008).  
Figure 3-3: Historic overview of how macroeconomic shocks affect the oil price 
 
Source: World Trade Resources Guide 2009 
 
Investment houses expect E&P spending to increase in the coming years which will increase 
demand for offshore oil service. The demand for bigger and stronger vessels has been a historic 
trend since offshore exploration and production of oil, but is now accelerating with the search 
for oil and gas in deeper waters. 
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Summary: World Economy 
The world economy is stabilizing and the outlook for coming years looks promising when we 
look at the GDP estimates. The developing countries are building up their economies and have a 
high growth rate. The developing countries will be a key driver for the demand for oil and gas. 
Recent oil and gas discoveries in Brazil are currently in a phase where they are building up their 
production capacity. The North Sea, West Africa and South East Asia are regions which currently 
have some problems, but improvements are expected. 
3.1.2 E&P spending and field development 
Exploration and Production (E&P) spending is pending on activities like aerial survey & seismic 
operations, exploration & appraisal drilling, development & production, and decommissioning & 
rehabilitation. E&P spending for offshore oil and gas installations is the most important 
determinant for activity within the offshore service market (Offshore Oil and Gas Environment 
Forum 2010). 
E&P is vulnerable to shocks in the world economy as discussed above. E&P can relative easily be 
put on hold by the oil companies, but it takes longer to put on stream. The offshore service 
market is therefore dependent on the oil companies and is volatile and risky. During the recent 
crisis, the decrease in E&P spending hit the offshore service market very hard.  
Figure 3-4: Estimated E&P spending growth for different investment companies 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
DnB NOR Markets has a comprehensive report on E&P spending. The survey is based on 70 oil 
and gas companies in the upstream oil and gas industry. DnB NOR Markets estimates an 
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increase of 11%, 8% and 5% for 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively for E&P spending. The 2009 
spending was revised from -8% to -7% in the august report and is then the same as the Carnegie 
E&P spending growth for 2009. The overall E&P spending has been rising steadily over the years, 
driven by the increasingly more challenging access to resources for the oil companies. The 
objective is to replace resources and maintain production levels. 
While oil prices dropped below USD 40/bbl in the crisis, it has now increased to around USD 
80/bbl. At the same time the overall macroeconomic conditions has become more stable and 
confidence is returning to the market.  
The demand for oil and gas is now starting to increase and the confidence among oil companies 
is increasing. Factors that have contributed to the confidence are higher commodity income and 
stabilized oil price. Onshore Large Cap Independents has shorter lead time and can more easily 
turn around projects that were put on hold. The national oil companies (NOCs) have longer lead 
time. The expected E&P spending growth for NOCs is 10% for 2010 compared to previous 
expected 14%. This is due to a high, but dampened growth rate of Petrobras and Petrochina.  
Determinants for E&P spending 
The most important element that determines the E&P spending is the oil price, with a lag of 6-
18 months because of time to adjust. Oil and gas companies are comfortable with the current 
high oil price level and they expect the oil price to be maintained with a slight increase. 
Expected oil prices are USD 80/bbl5 for 2010 and USD 85/bbl for 2011. There are many factors 
which indicate this. An increase in demand and tightness in refining capacity, demand for 
holding stocks due to geopolitical issues, poor supply from non-OPEC countries, and finally a 
rising marginal costs and a weaker dollar (DnB NOR Markets 2010). This indicates high long term 
spending. A second element is that the estimated long-term spending remains at high levels due 
to strong underlying fundamentals. Fundamentals like declining exploration in existing oil fields 
implies that production must come from new fields and enhanced oil production from existing 
fields. There are no current alternatives to fossil fuel, while the demand for oil is increasing. 
                                                          
5 bbl = barrel  
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Global production (from existing fields) is declining with a 2.6% decline in 2009 compared to 
2008. 
 A third element is the hurdle rate oil price. The hurdle rate oil price reflects the cost where it is 
profitable to produce one barrel of oil. The hurdle rate increased 11 % to 56 USD/bbl from 2009 
to 2010 (DnB NOR Markets 2010). Increase in the hurdle rate leads to an increase in activity for 
unconventional oil extraction like oil-shales, bitumen and ultra deepwater oil extraction. 
Production of conventional oil is onshore production where cost of production is relatively low.    
Figure 3-5: Long-term oil-supply curve 
 
Source: IEA 2008 
 
Figure 3-5 illustrates production cost for different resources. It is cheapest to produce 
conventional oil and OPEC countries have much of this resource. When the hurdle rate 
increases it becomes economical to produce from unconventional resources. In the center of 
figure 3-5 we can see deep water-, ultra deep water-, heavy oil- and bitumen production costs. 
These resources are well below the current hurdle rate of 56 USD/bbl and are economical to 
produce. The technology for oil shales, gas to liquid and coal to liquid exist and are produced on 
a small scale today. It is however not economical to produce from these resources on a large 
scale. Resources with high hurdle rates are of large quantities and explain why we can assume a 
backstop price which is a maximum price of oil. The backstop price reflects the limitation on 
how high the oil price can become before alternative resources are economical to develop 
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(Hannesson 2010). Unconventional resources will come on stream if prices of oil and gas 
become too high. 
The consensus from the oil-companies is that long term demand is up and the reserve 
replacement ratio (RRR) is above 100% (DnB NOR Markets 2010). The RRR tells us if companies 
are replacing reserves as they are being produced. The demand and production is constantly 
increasing and replacing the reserves is becoming more difficult. To replace reserves the oil 
companies must increase their E&P spending. The expected annual declining rate of existing 
fields is 4.5% and with an increasing demand it looks promising for the demand for oil service 
companies because this mismatch must be met with production in new fields and enhanced oil 
recovery. The world RRR has been well above 100% since production of offshore oil and gas 
started, but is now moving toward the 100% mark. Independent oil companies are struggling 
more than national oil companies.   
Drivers for constraints of E&P spending 
According to the oil and gas companies in the DnB NOR Markets survey we can see from figure 
3-6 that prices were the most limiting factor for E&P spending in 2009. That put pressure on the 
oil service market.  
Figure 3-6: Constraints for E&P spending 
The constraints have 
shifted towards capital 
constraints and regulatory 
issues in 2010, mainly due 
to the GOM accident and 
the new expected 
legislation. Oil and gas 
companies are expecting 
an increase in cost of 1% in 2010. In the diagram we can see that changes in prices which 
involves offshore service had a high focus in 2009, while it was less important in 2010. 
 
Source: DnB NOR Markets 2010 
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Composition of E&P spending 
The DnB NOR Markets survey showed that oil companies have increased their focus on 
deepwater. We can see from figure 3-7 that exploration activity in deepwater (3,000+ ft) was 50 
% while production in deepwater was 35% in 2010 which is in line with surveys in earlier years. 
Figure 3-7: Offshore exploration and production 
Exploration has been quite 
stable at 20% of total E&P 
spending for several years while 
80% consist of production. 
Exploration dropped to 17% in 
2010 which affected the 
offshore service market hard. It 
is expecting to be 21% in 2011. The focus toward deepwater is due to better technology, 
declining alternatives in shallow waters, and the potential for large discoveries in deeper 
waters. Attractive deepwater regions have in recent years been the North- and South America, 
and West Africa. An interesting region in the near future can be Stochman, but there is much 
political uncertainty surrounding the development. 
Field development and subsea construction 
The age profile for jack-up rigs show that there where a large number of newbuildings in the 
late 70ies and early 80ies. These are getting old and it is now an increase in newbuilds for this 
segment to cover deepwater drilling demand. Many fields are expected to come on stream in 
2010 and beyond which will increase order intake for jack-up rigs and FPSO and therefore the 
subsea sector. Deepwater production indicates the need for subsea wells and FPSOs, therefore 
we assume this market to experience high growth in the short and long term. Estimates for new 
FPSO contracts (Carnegie 2010) are in the range 10-15 and 15-20 in 2010 and 2011. Technip are 
the most optimistic with 88 new contracts during the period from 2010 to 2012.    
 
Source: DnB NOR Markets 2010 
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E&P spending growth 
Contribution to spending growth is driven by the national oil companies (NOCs), but we can also 
see from figure 3-8 that 54% of the E&P spending growth comes from the Independents and the 
Majors are holding back in 2010. 
Figure 3-8: Share of E&P spending growth amongst the oil companies 
 
Source: DnB NOR Markets 2010 
 
Oil companies in the DnB NOR Markets survey indicate a total E&P spending growth of 8% for 
2011. The growth for NOCs and The Majors is larger for 2011 than for the independents. NOCs 
are the biggest contributor to E&P spending growth and are estimated to be so in the nearby 
future.  
Upside potential for E&P spending 
- The market is stabilizing through demand and commodity prices which increase the cash 
flow, confidence and financial strength of the independents and the majors.  
- We have recently experienced an economy with higher growth and the world economy 
is currently coming out of the financial crisis. National oil companies will have less 
problem getting approved budgets with a settled economy.  
- DnB NOR Markets believes that the spending level will stay robust with an oil prices 
above USD 50/bbl. They estimate an oil price of USD 80/bbl and USD 85/bbl in 2010 and 
2011 respectively. Brent Crude Oil is USD 91.05/bbl as of 09.12.2010.  
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- The deepwater drilling moratorium in Golf of Mexico was lifted the October 12 2010 
with some new regulations. The moratorium has dampened the drilling effort in GOM 
and in other deepwater regions as well.  
Potential downside risks of E&P spending 
The E&P growth has in retrospect followed the aggregated growth for the companies listed at 
the offshore service sector index (OSX). The estimated revenue growth for the OSX listed 
companies is 13% in 2011 and the estimated spending growth is 8% in 2011. The estimated 
revenue growth is 5% above the estimated spending growth. This mismatch is a risk since 
offshore service companies is highly correlated with the OSX index (DnB NOR Markets 2010). 
Offshore service costs 
Over time the OSV market have adjusted to the needs from oil and gas companies. Demand for 
higher quality service requires larger and stronger vessels, improved efficiency and in general 
better operations.  
We mentioned that the incident in GoM has led to new legislation to prevent similar accidents, 
and more legislation is expected. It is expected that subsea operating costs in particular and 
offshore service costs in general will increase through Health, Quality, Safety and Environment 
(HQSE) legislations in the GoM region, which is assumed to manifest to other regions. 
Table 3-1: Expected average operating expenses for vessel type for 2009-2012  
Long run operating cost for the OSV 
companies determines the cost of 
offshore service for the oil companies 
because the OSV market must have a 
reasonable return on investments. DnB 
NOR Markets have estimated the 
average operating cost in the North Sea 
Vessel type Description Average op. cost 
AHTS UUL: 25,000+ BHP 13 000 
AHTS UL: 23-25,000 BHP 8 000 
AHTS L: 16-23,000 BHP 7 000 
AHTS M: 10-16,000 BHP 6 000 
AHTS S: <10,000+ BHP 5 000 
PSV UL: 4,000+ DWT 5 750 
PSV L: 3-4,000 DWT 4 600 
PSV M: 2-3,000 DWT 4 600 
PSV S: <2,000 DWT 4 025 
Source: DnB NOR Markets 2010 
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region for the different vessels with different specifications. Table 3-1 show the average 
operating costs for offshore services for oil companies in 2009 which are expected to be 
maintained to 2012.  
Technology 
Technology aiming to increase revenue seems to be more important than technology to reduce 
costs. Oil companies in the DnB NOR Markets survey show that the most attractive technologies 
are the ones that improve the oil recovery rate and the probability of identifying reserves.  
Enhanced oil recovery (EOC) technologies are used to increase the recovery rate that usually is 
between 20-50% and accounted for 3% of the oil production in 2008 (IEA 2008). Technology and 
exploration of the field increase recoverable reserves, and reserves are therefore revised 
continuously. 
3.1.3 Summary Ship Demand 
We have discussed the world economy which is linked to E&P spending and field development. 
E&P spending is the most important determinant for the demand for OSV and subsea vessels. 
The financial crisis and the incident in GOM dampened E&P spending in 2009, but E&P spending 
is now improving and has upside potential. We will now discuss offshore service and subsea 
demand and for offshore service pay most attention to the high end segment. High end PSVs are 
classified as 3,000+ DWT and AHTS vessels are classified as midrange (10-15,000 BHP) and high 
end (15,000+ BHP). 
AHTS and PSV Demand 
The demand for AHTSs and PSVs are dependent on the overall market demand which we 
discussed earlier. There are however some development to pay attention to. From figure 3-9 we 
can see that the growth in total AHTS demand has been higher than for total PSV demand the 
last few years. High end PSV demand has an expected annual growth rate of 3.77% from 2009 to 
2013. The midrange and high end AHTS demand has an expected annual growth rate of 4.49% 
and 5.74% during the same period. The outlook for high end AHTS demand is better.  
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Figure 3-9: Demand for OSVs 
 
The accumulated annual growth rate for demand of high end PSVs has been 14.4% from 2006 to 
2009 and the accumulated annual growth is expected to be -2.7%, 6.7%, 7.8% and 3.6% for the 
period 2010- 2013. The total fleet`s accumulated annual growth rate was 7.75% from 2005 Q2 
to 2010 Q1 in comparison. High end demand for PSV has increased more than total demand for 
PSV and is expected to do so in the future (ODS-Petrodata 2010). 
Demand for midrange and high end AHTS has increased considerably more than the total 
demand for AHTS. Accumulated annual growth rate for total AHTS demand was 3.6% from Q2 
2005 to Q1 2010. The demand for midrange AHTS was 11.8% from 2005-2009 and has an 
average expected growth rate of 4.5% from 2009 to 2013. The demand growth for high end 
AHTS was even higher from 2005 to 2009 at an average rate of 12.1% and has an average 
growth rate of 5.7% from 2009 to 2013.  
The development illustrates that the market demands larger and stronger vessels. We expect 
the development to continue in the future and there will be less increase in demand for the low 
end vessels.  
  
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
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Subsea Demand 
Offshore oil production is becoming more technically advanced and exploration is moving 
towards deeper waters. The subsea market is therefore growing and demand for advanced 
vessels is rising. The Subsea market is not easy to analyze because there are many different 
vessels with different specifications to support the subsea market. We have divided the subsea 
market into Pipelay Vessels (PLV), Remotely Operated Vehicle Support Vessels (ROVSV) and 
Diving Support Vessels (DSV). Multipurpose Vessels are incorporated into ROVSVs. 
Figure 3-10: Subsea demand 
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
 
We can see from figure 3-10 that total subsea demand will increase from around 150 vessels in 
2005 to an expected demand just over 350 vessels in 2014. We can also see the impact from the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009, but the growth is expected to pick up with the increase in floating 
production installations and the movement toward production from deeper wells. The annual 
average growth in demand from 2010 to 2014 is expected to be 24% for DSV, 46% for ROVSV 
and 30% for PLV (ODS-Petrodata 2010). 
Floating Production, Storage and Off-loading (FPSO) accounted for 47% of total floating 
production demand in 2010. DnB NOR Markets has in their survey estimated demand for FPSO 
over the next 8 years to be 117. The most important region is South America, with Petrobras as 
the biggest contributor to demand. South America holds 33% of total estimated demand for 
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FPSO. The Asia Pacific region is the second largest region with 26% of total estimated demand 
for FPSO. West Africa and The North Sea follows with 21% and 12 % of total demand.  
Demand for subsea vessels increase with the search in deeper waters. Figure 3-11 illustrates 
that the development for subsea wells has grown rapidly the recent years.  
Figure 3-11: Subsea development wells by water depth  
 
Source: Prospectus DOF ASA 2009 
 
Worldwide subsea developments show an increase of deepwater wells and decrease of shallow 
water wells. Figure 3-11 illustrates what we discussed in relation to figure 3-5. The development 
in deepwater wells has become economical viable because of higher oil price and limited new 
discoveries from shallow water. 
Conclusion 
Demand for OSV has grown at a high rate in recent years. The recent recession led to a 
downturn in demand, but is expected to improve. The developments in demand for larger and 
stronger vessels are expected to continue as we move toward deeper waters. From figure 3-11 
we can see that deepwater development is expected to increase demand for subsea vessels 
significantly. The subsea market is currently in high growth.  
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3.2 Ship Supply 
Ship supply is controlled by the decision-makers in shipping companies. It is difficult to adjust 
supply of offshore service and subsea vessels to meet demand in the short run. Yards usually 
take 2-3 years to build and deliver advanced OSV and subsea vessels and it can even take as 
long as 4 years if the yards are busy. Supply is driven by the owners or individuals responsible 
for decisions within the companies; the supply is based on the subjective view of these 
individuals. 
3.2.1 Total existing fleet  
The total existing fleet consists of about 1,400 AHTS vessels, 1050 PSVs and 340 subsea vessels 
globally as of June 2010 (ODS-Petrodata 2010). Supply is now in a high growth trend and supply 
is expected to increase significantly in the coming years. The active existing fleet for different 
segment is difficult to keep track of because the fleet is large and diversified. The active fleet is 
continuously changing because vessels can stop working for a given period due to layup, transit 
and maintenance. 
Table 3-2: Existing OSV and subsea fleet 
 
Segment Existing fleet 
As of June 2010 
Average fleet 
2010 
Older than 20 yrs 
As of June 2010 
Newbuilds 
As of Jan. 2010 
AHTS AHTS AHTS AHTS AHTS 
<9.999BHP 996 956 482 265 
10.000-14.999BHP 227 218 77 89 
>15.000BHP  178 165 6 103 
 Totalt 1401  1339 565 457 
PSV PSV PSV PSV PSV 
<2.999 DWT 557 566 290 46 
3.000+ DWT 487 463 12 224 
Totalt 1044 1029 302 270 
OSV OSV OSV OSV OSV 
Total 2445 2368 867 727 
Subsea Subsea Subsea Subsea Subsea 
ROVSV 141 159 17 56 
DSV 76 88 45 63 
PLV 126 133 78 38 
Total 343 380 140 157 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
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Table 3-2 presents an overview of the OSV and subsea fleet from June 2010, expected average 
for 2010, vessels older than 20 years and actual newbuildings on order as of January 2010. Age 
and newbuildings will be discussed more in detail later in this chapter.  
High end OSV fleet 
Arctic defines high-end PSV to be 2,000+ DWT and high-end AHTS 10,000+ BHP which is 
different to what we use in this thesis. Figure 3-12 illustrates the opposite development in the 
high end fleet compared to the total fleet. 
Figure 3-12: Existing OSV Fleet 
The high end AHTS fleet is 
considerably lower than the high end 
PSV fleet when compared to the total 
fleet. This is consistent with the high 
number of new deliveries of high end 
PSV the last few years, and that the 
average age of high-end PSV fleet is 
low. We will come back to the age 
profile of the vessels.  
Subsea fleet  
Figure 3-13: Subsea Fleet 
 
The composition of the subsea fleet is presented in 
figure 3-13. The ROVSV fleet is expected to 
increase to 43% the next few years and PLV fleet is 
expected to decrease to 35%. 
 
 
Source: Arctic Securities 2010 
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
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Regional markets 
The main geographical markets for high end AHTS is Asia-Pacific, and with the North Sea and 
South-America as the second largest markets. The main region for PSV is the North Sea, with 
Latin America as the second largest region.  
Figure 3-14: High  end supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-14 illustrates high end supply of OSV in different regions. South America (ultra 
deepwater region) and Asia-Pacific (deepwater region) is in an expanding phase and there are 
many AHTS operating in these regions. Ultra deepwater regions like South America, North 
America and West Africa will increasingly demand high end vessels. The North Sea is in shallow 
water compared to these, but with the harsh wheater conditions in this region, the demand for 
larger and strong vessels is increasing.  
Brazil and West Africa are regions with high growth for subsea vessels and the supply will 
increase significantly in these regions. The Asia-Pacific is currently the largest region for Derrick 
pipelay vessels while Brazil, Nigeria and Angola are the regions with most reeled pipelay vessels. 
In general the outlook for subsea vessels looks promising in all regions, but the regions in 
shallow water has limited need for subsea vessels. This includes the North Sea, the 
mediteranian and the Middle East. 
Fleet age 
During the energy crisis in the mid seventies and early eighties the oil price and the market 
activity increased significantly. There was a newbuilding boom at this time. Vessels built in that 
  
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
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period are beyond the 25 year threshold and are soon passing the technical lifetime threshold 
for OSV of 30 years. These vessels will soon be obsolete and disappear from the market, easing 
the supply side. 
The age profile presented by ODS-Petrodata divides the AHTS segments into combined tug and 
supply vessels and pure tug vessels. Table 3-3 illustrates the age profile for AHTS and shows a 
large number of old and new vessels under 15,000 BHP. The increasing demand for high end 
AHTS vessels (15,000+ BHP) can be seen through the large number of deliveries of high end 
vessels in recent years.  
Table 3-3: Age-profile for AHTS fleet  
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
The age profile for PSVs shows exactly the same development in table 3-4. High end PSVs are 
quite new while the smaller PSVs are divided into old and new vessels.  
Table 3-4: Age-profile for PSV fleet  
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
The age profile for subsea vessels in table 3-5 shows that many subsea vessels are old. 59% of 
DSV are older 20 years, but there are many new vessels built in recent years. The age profile for 
ROVSV shows a younger fleet where 72% was built during the last 10 years. There are also many 
old PLV, where 61% of the vessels are older than 25 years.  
 
Global AHTS-fleet 
 age by BHP 
0-5 
years 
6-10  
years 
11-15 
years 
16-20  
years 
21-25 
years 
26-30  
years 
31+ 
years 
<10,000 BHP 404 76 24 10 49 242 191 
10-15,000 BHP 106 23 19 7 17 54 6 
15,000+ BHP 84 46 34 8 4 1 1 
Total 594 145 77 25 70 297 198 
Global PSV-fleet  
age by DWT 
0-5 
years 
6-10 
years 
11-15 
years 
16-20 
years 
21-25 
years 
26-30 
years 
31+  
years 
PSV <3,000 DWT 114 73 71 9 21 159 110 
PSV 3,000+ DWT 284 113 58 20 1 8 3 
Total 398 186 129 29 22 167 113 
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Table 3-5: Age-profile for Subsea fleet  
Global subsea-fleet 
Age by segment 
0-5 
years 
6-10 
years 
11-15 
years 
16-20 
years 
21-25 
years 
26-30 
years 
DSV 20 6 5 0 14 31 
ROVSV 65 36 16 7 3 14 
PLV 29 8 6 3 2 76 
Total 114 50 27 10 19 121 
Source: ODS- Petrodata 2010 
The age profile for subsea vessels illustrates that the subsea fleet has some very old vessels, but 
there have been many newbuildings in the last decade. There has been a high growth in subsea 
vessels since 1998 and vessel deliveries are expected to peak in 2010 with roughly 94 vessels 
being delivered into the market. If we divide the subsea vessels into size (small: <115 meters 
and large: >115 meters) and look at the age profile(Prospectus DOF ASA 2009), we can see that 
there is only a limited number of small subsea vessels older than 20 years and just a couple 
older than the 30 year economic lifetime threshold. Delivery of small subsea vessels has been 
relatively extensive for the last few years. The fleet of large subsea vessels is smaller, where 60% 
of the vessels are older than 20 years. There is currently an order-book for new subsea vessels 
that is 80% of the existing fleet. The numbers are from March 2009, but give a view of the age 
for large and small subsea vessels. 
3.2.2 The newbuilding market 
According to Arctic securities the net fleet growth of OSV is expected to be 18%, 4% and 2% in 
the period 2010-2012. This amounts to a total net increase of 24% in the coming years, 
assuming no attrition or cancelations, which is unlikely. Carnegie expects the net fleet growth to 
be 9%, 5% and 2% in 2010-2012 respectively. The Carnegie report is a newer report with 
deliveries in 2010 incorporated in the existing fleet. This can to some extent explain the 
differences. 
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Figure 3-15: OSV orders 
Figure 3-15 illustrates high order activity in 
2006 and 2007 for both AHTS and PSV. 2008 
was a god year for PSV as well. Many of the 
orders were pushed back because of the 
financial crisis and are coming on stream in 
2010 and 2011. This will increase supply and 
in turn put pressure on the offshore service 
companies.   
Scheduled deliveries of newbuildings are continuously 
sliding, shown in table 3-6. The Q2 estimate for 
delivery of OSVs for 2009 was 295, 265 for Q3 and 
ended up on 180 vessels delivered in 2009. This was 
due to the problem that OSV companies had with 
securing financing during the crisis. 2010 and 2011 
show an increasing path of estimates for deliveries. Orders can be cancelled and deliveries can 
be pushed back. Estimates are therefore highly uncertain and vary along with the demand for 
vessels. Push-backs are quite common while cancelations are more rare, but cancellations do 
occur and especially during a crisis. 5 ROVSV were for instance cancelled because of the recent 
financial crisis (ODS-Petrodata 2010).  
Figure 3-16: OSV deliveries by vessel type 
From figure 3-16 we can see that 
expected total deliveries for 2010, 
2011 and 2012 are 397, 122 and 27 
respectively. ODS-Petrodata 
estimates are close to Arctic`s 
estimates. 
  
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
Table 3-6: Newbuilding estimates 
Newbuilding  
estimates 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
Q1/09 290 145 35  
Q2/09 295 160 35  
Q3/09 265 180 45  
Q4/09 180 255 55  
Source: Arctic Securities 2010 
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
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Yards 
Yards all over the world build OSVs, but offshore shipbuilding is more technological advanced, 
except for the vessels hull, compared to pure shipbuilding. Modern yards have to be used. 
Norwegian yards had the biggest market share for offshore service and subsea vessels which 
was 24% in 2007 (Ocean Shipping Consultants 2007). 
There have been many OSV and subsea newbuildings in the last couple of years to meet the 
increase in demand, but supply has grown faster than demand. This has resulted in an 
overcapacity for offshore yards. Due to expected market improvements for rigs, the outlook for 
offshore yards looks better than for pure shipbuilding yards. The moratorium in the US Gulf 
however brings uncertainty around new rig orders.  
Korean yards are mainly pure shipbuilding yards and do not construct advanced vessels like 
OSVs and subsea vessels, but they are now moving into the market. Korean yards are in the 
process of upgrading their yards which will increase their market share for offshore shipbuilding 
and put pressure on other offshore yards (DnB NOR Markets 2010).   
Brazil is different due to the nature of the local requirements and has one yard which is capable 
of building advanced OSV and subsea vessels. Offshore service companies can import two times 
the DWT which is built in Brazil under Brazilian flag. The yard is quite new and there is a 
shortage of workforce that are capable of building these vessels and the vessels are therefore 
more expensive. 
Arctic securities states that they expect 2010 to be the peak in the number of deliveries because 
orders have been reduced since 2008. They also expect 10-15% of the deliveries scheduled in 
2011 and beyond to be cancelled  
3.2.5 Attrition 
Vessel attrition has increased during the last decade. We earlier looked at the age profile for 
OSVs and subsea vessels. Many of the OSV and subsea vessels are beyond or will soon pass the 
technical lifetime threshold for the vessels and are due for scrapping. Many of the scrapped and 
laid up vessels has come from GoM or the Asia-Pacific. In a market under pressure, old vessels 
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are laid up first and they are more likely to be scrapped. Scrapped and laid up vessels exceeded 
newbuildings in late 2009 which implies that the active fleet decreased (Deep Sea Supply Q2 
2010). Historically the attrition rate has been 2% per year. It is common that old OSVs that are 
not strong enough or large enough are transformed into subsea vessels because the hull is still 
often in good condition.  
Old vessels built during the oil crisis in the mid 70ies and early 80ies are scrapped unless they 
can provide short term profit that covers operating cost, cost of certification and cost of repair. 
We will in our sensitivity analysis in chapter 6.4.4 see how the utilization can be affected by 
attrition of older vessels. 
3.2.3 Summary 
OSV fleet 
To summarize we will use figures from ODS-Petrodata and use average vessel supply each year. 
From table 3-7 we can see that the supply of high end AHTS vessels (15,000+ BHP) is expected 
to increase at a higher rate than the midrange AHTS (10-14,999 BHP) and the midrange AHTS is 
expected to increase at a higher rate than the smaller AHTS (<10,000 BHP). Similar development 
is expected for the growth rate in supply of high end PSVs (3,000+ DWT) in contrast to smaller 
PSVs (<3,000 DWT).   
Table 3-7: OSV supply by vessel type 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
Supply for OSV vessels has been high for some years now to meet the increase in demand. 
Larger and stronger vessels are increasingly entering the market. The supply of high end vessels 
has increased more than smaller vessels and is expected to do so in the future. 
 
Segment 2009 2010 % 2011 % 2012 % 2013 % 
AHTS 15,000+ BHP 142 165 16,2 220 33,3 242 10,0 245 11,4 
10-14,999 BHP 190 218 14,7 266 22 277 4 279 0,7 
<10,000 BHP 868 956 10,1 1113 16,4 1133 1,8 1133 0 
PSV 3,000+ DWT 397 463 16,6 571 23,3 609 6,7 621 2 
<3,000 DWT 554 566 2,2 591 4,4 598 1,2 600 0,3 
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Subsea fleet 
Many of the OSV companies are moving into the subsea market and have acquired subsea 
vessels to exploit the expected growing market. To combine the anchor handling operations and 
supply service with subsea services will diversify their operations and could create competitive 
advantages. It is possible to combine the two services. Many AHTSs and PSV are now equipped 
to support subsea operations. The existing fleet of subsea vessels is 343(June 2010) and had an 
order book of 157 vessels as of January 2010 (ODS-Petrodata).  
From table 3-8 we can see that the number of vessels expected to enter the market in 2010 and 
2011 are very high. Most of the subsea vessels were ordered in the economic upturn prior to 
the financial crisis. 
Table 3-8: Subsea supply by vessel type 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
When we discussed the age profile we saw that there were many new and many very old 
vessels. ROVSV had the youngest fleet and we notice that the supply will increase most for this 
segment. This is not surprising because of the high growth in demand for this segment which we 
mentioned in chapter 3.1. Newbuilds of DSV entering the market is also very high, while 
newbuilds of PLV is more moderate.  
  
Subsea supply 2009 2010 % 2011 % 2012 % 2013 % 
DSV 66 88 33,3 95 8 99 4,2 99 0 
ROVSV 119 159 33,6 187 17,6 193 3,2 196 1,6 
PLV 119 133 11,8 149 12 156 4,7 158 1,3 
Total 304 380 25 431 13,4 448 3,9 453 1,1 
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3.3 Investor sentiment 
The supply of AHTS, PSV and subsea vessels is controlled by the decision-makers (Stopford 
2009); Vessel-owners, vessel-operators, finance institutions and regulatory authorities. The two 
later decision-makers limit the investors to do as they see fit. Finance institutions lend money to 
the investor and they can put pressure on the investor. Regulatory authorities set the rules for 
HQSE through legislation for the offshore service market, and affect the offshore service 
companies. The supply side of the market model is therefore behavioral and is not easy to 
predict. Different strategies are used and the investors can interpret the market in different 
ways. The investor decides when it is economical lucrative to order and scrap vessels. The 
investors must analyze demand and supply, and the expected developments. How the investors 
react to the market by making decisions affects rates, asset prices and utilization. We will 
discuss this further in chapter 3.4, where we discuss the balance between demand and supply. 
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3.4 Balance between demand and supply 
The balance chapter will address the balance between demand and supply. An important 
measuring tool for the offshore service market is the ratio of OSVs to rigs/installations. The ratio 
changes continuously as the total existing active fleet changes and the demand for oil service 
changes. The market consists of a dynamic relation, meaning that the demand-supply 
relationship affect the rate market, utilization and the asset prices which in turn affect the total 
existing active fleet through investor sentiment. 
The offshore service market is influenced by the world economy and is characterized by 
continuing cycles which depend on the balance between demand and supply. The offshore 
service market is as for pure shipping characterized by cycles, where the negotiation power 
between oil companies and offshore service companies shifts. The balance is reflected through 
rates, but also through utilization and asset prices. 
Figure 3-17: Short term cycles 
Figure 3-17 illustrate a 
short term cycle. A peak 
in the cycle implies that 
the balance between 
demand and supply 
favors offshore service 
companies. Rates are 
high and oil companies 
bear the risks and have 
relatively high costs attributed to the service provided by offshore service companies. In a 
trough the situation is opposite. Rates are low and the offshore service companies bear the 
risks. The break even cost of offshore service determines the long run cost for the oil 
companies. A reasonable return on investment for the oil service companies must cover long 
run costs which we discussed in chapter 3.1.2 under offshore service cost.  
  
 
Source: Stopford 2009, adjusted by authors 
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3.4.1 Development in demand and supply for OSV 
Carnegie defines high end PSV to be 3,000+ DWT and high end AHTS to be 15,000+ BHP. DOF`s 
vessels are over these limits except one PSV which is slightly below 3.000 DWT and two AHTS 
vessels which are under the 15.000 BHP limit. The high end development is therefore the most 
important aspect of the market to analyze. Table 3-9 show historic development for demand 
and supply for OSVs, and Carnegie`s expectations for the future.  
Table 3-9: Demand in regions and total supply  
 
The high-end AHTS development shows that forecasted growth in supply and demand for AHTS 
vessels are similar. We also notice that the expected growth in demand for South and Central 
America is high, mostly due to the deepwater fields in Brazil. High-end PSV development show 
high growth in demand for most regions except for the mature Northwest Europe region which 
currently has a declining production rate. Supply for high end AHTS and PSV are expected to 
increase at a slightly higher rate than demand which will put pressure on the high end market. It 
is currently pressure on the high end OSV market and we can see that the expected growth in 
demand will not surpass growth in supply before 2012. 
Source: Carnegie 2010 
AHTS>15,000BHP Jun-00 Jun-01 Jun-02 Jun-03 Jun-04 Jun-05 Jun-06 Jun-07 Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11e Jun-12e 2010-2012e
SE Asia 4 5 8 5 10 11 7 15 18 20 30 33 40 33,3 %
South and central America 8 12 11 14 11 14 19 24 23 30 37 51 55 48,6 %
Mediterranean 1 1 1 4 5 5 6 4 7 13 14 15 17 21,4 %
Northwest Europe 12 16 13 18 14 18 22 18 22 24 18 20 21 16,7 %
Weat Africa 5 9 12 10 10 15 15 18 15 17 17 20 27 58,8 %
North America 3 3 4 5 9 7 8 11 9 11 15 15 15 0,0 %
Total demand 33 46 49 56 59 70 77 90 94 115 131 154 175 33,6 %
Growth 39 % 7 % 14 % 5 % 19 % 10 % 17 % 4 % 22 % 14 % 18 % 14 % 33,6 %
Total Supply 51 59 68 86 90 94 101 115 128 151 185 234 248 34,1 %
Growth 16 % 15 % 26 % 5 % 4 % 7 % 14 % 11 % 18 % 23 % 26 % 6 % 34,1 %
PSV>3.000DWT Jun-00 Jun-01 Jun-02 Jun-03 Jun-04 Jun-05 Jun-06 Jun-07 Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11e Jun-12e 2010-2012e
SE Asia 6 6 8 10 15 13 17 30 29 45 55 66 78 41,8 %
South and central America 7 10 13 19 24 27 29 41 41 56 92 97 107 16,3 %
Mediterranean 1 2 1 1 5 5 9 11 16 16 22 27 30 36,4 %
Northwest Europe 61 65 73 74 68 96 117 134 136 144 153 153 153 0,0 %
West Africa 1 4 8 13 22 28 36 42 43 58 58 68 80 37,9 %
North America 12 14 19 35 39 39 48 55 52 56 60 70 89 48,3 %
Total demand 88 101 122 152 173 208 256 313 317 375 440 481 537 22,0 %
Growth 15 % 21 % 25 % 14 % 20 % 23 % 22 % 1 % 18 % 17 % 9 % 12 % 22,0 %
Total Supply 93 102 128 174 202 219 270 322 356 424 502 602 631 25,7 %
Growth 10 % 25 % 36 % 16 % 8 % 23 % 19 % 11 % 19 % 18 % 20 % 5 % 25,7 %
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3.4.2 OSV to Offshore installations ratio 
The ratio of OSVs to rigs/installations indicates how much supply is needed for demand. The 
aggregate growth for drilling rigs which consists of drill-ships, jack-ups and semisubmersibles 
was 18% between 2005 and 2009, while the growth in OSV was 49%. From 2009 to 2012 the 
drilling rigs is expected to grow 19% and OSV 22%. DnB NOR Markets indicate that the 
accumulated ratio for OSV to rigs will be 3.0 for 2010 and 2011. It is expected to come down to 
2.9 in 2012 and it is expected that the market can absorb the ratio at this time, but the pressure 
remains on the OSV market. Historical average ratio from 2000-2009 is 2.4 (DnB NOR Markets 
2010). 
Table 3-10 consist of numbers from the Arctic Securities and Carnegie. The growth ratio for 
2009 and 2010 is very high (4.02 and 4.70), which correspond to the high number of vessel 
deliveries these years. The accumulated ratio is expected to hit its peak in 2010, and with a 
slight reduction in 2011. We can therefore relate expectations in the Arctic report to the same 
expectations in the DnB NOR Markets report. Two assumptions for the table are given. 1) 
current newbuilding orders are delivered on time and 2) no attrition. The two assumptions are 
highly unrealistic. Highlighted in light blue are Carnegie`s numbers. Carnegie did not foreclose 
any numbers for drilling rigs or floating production. Expected deliveries in 2010 seem to roughly 
correspond to Arctic`s numbers while Carnegie expects more deliveries in 2011. 
Table 3-10: OSV to Offshore installations ratio 
 
Source: Carnegie 2010, Arctic Securities 2010 
2009a 2010e 2010e 2011e 2011e 09-10 10-11 10-11 11-12 11-12 08-12
Drilling rigs
Jakup 398 414 440 24 29 14 5,5 % 6,3 % 2,8 % 15,2 %
Semisubm, 166 167 172 15 21 9 8,7 % 11,2 % 4,3 % 26,2 %
Drillships 38 39 42 7 13 18 16,7 % 26,5 % 29,0 % 90,5 %
Sum 602 620 654 46 63 41 7,0 % 9,0 % 5,4 % 22,9 %
Foating prod,
FPSO 108 123 144 13 9 14 9,0 % 5,7 % 8,4 % 25,0 %
FSO 81 88 88 4 9 1 4,5 % 9,8 % 1,0 % 15,9 %
TLP 19 22 24 0 0 0 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 %
Spar 14 15 16 1 1 0 6,3 % 5,9 % 0,0 % 12,5 %
Semi 35 37 40 2 1 0 5,0 % 2,4 % 0,0 % 7,5 %
Sum 257 285 312 20 20 15 6,4 % 6,0 % 4,3 % 17,6 %
Supply
AHTS 1009 1166 1203 180 1424 255 136 56 68 15,0 % 18,4 % 9,6 % 3,4 % 4,4 % 40,8 %
PSV 860 850 913 85 1040 135 86 50 61 9,3 % 13,5 % 8,3 % 4,4 % 5,4 % 29,6 %
Sum 1869 2016 2116 265 2464 390 222 106 129 12,5 % 16,4 % 9,0 % 3,8 % 4,8 % 36,0 %
Growth ratio 4,02 4,70 1,89
Acc. gr.ratio 2,18 2,23 2,19 2,31 2,49 2,46
Newbuilds (actual 2009 and estimates 2010-11) Percentage fleet growthFleet as of 
1.Jan-07
Fleet as 
of 1.Jan-
Fleet as 
of 1.Jan-
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2010 and 2011 has a high ratio because supply is expected to grow faster than demand and 
therefore the pressure will remain on the OSV companies. The accumulated ratio is expected to 
improve from late 2011. Note that DnB NOR Markets use rigs while Arctic Securities use total 
installations which gives a lower ratio. 
3.4.3 Utilization 
Utilization is a result of the balance between demand and supply for vessels and is correlated 
with the development of rates and asset prices. Utilization provides information on the 
tightness in the offshore service and subsea market, whether there is over/undersupply of 
vessels in the markets. A company`s contract coverage provides information about expected 
utilization in the future and utilization provides information about how well the companies are 
utilizing their vessels. 
The OSV market 
Historical utilization for the total OSV fleet has been between 80-90% in the period 2001-2007. 
It started to decline and in Q1 2010 utilization reached 71%. The reason for the decline in 
utilization from the end of 2007 was du to the continuously growth in supply combined with a 
more moderate growth in demand. The financial crisis led to a decline in utilization. This is the 
case for most segments within the OSV market. The total AHTS fleet utilization reached 72.1% in 
Q1 2010 shown in figure 3-18. 
Figure 3-18: Total AHTS Utilization 
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
0.0 %
20.0 %
40.0 %
60.0 %
80.0 %
100.0 %
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2001 
Q1
2001 
Q3
2002 
Q1
2002 
Q3
2003 
Q1
2003 
Q3
2004 
Q1
2004 
Q3
2005 
Q1
2005 
Q3
2006 
Q1
2006 
Q3
2007 
Q1
2007 
Q3
2008 
Q1
2008 
Q3
2009 
Q1
2009 
Q3
2010 
Q1
N
um
be
r o
f v
es
se
ls
AHTS Demand AHTS Supply AHTS utilization
 Ch
ap
te
r:
 3
 
Th
e 
M
ar
ke
t 
5
7 
 
Utilization for midrange and high end AHTS are illustrated in figure 3-19. Midrange AHTS 
utilization is higher than total AHTS utilization. The decline in utilization is expected to hit 
bottom in 2011 with 70%. Utilization is expected to improve with better market conditions. 
Utilization for high end AHTS is expected to bottom out at 55% before it starts to increase. 
Figure 3-19: Midrange and high end AHTS utilization 
 
Utilization for the total PSV fleet was 72.4% in Q1 2010 illustrated in figure 3-20. The high end 
PSVs is expected to bottom out at 67.3% in 2011 and then increase. Utilization for high end PSVs 
looks better than for the high end AHTS in figure 3-19 due to a more moderate increase in 
supply for high end PSVs.  
Figure 3-20: Total and high end PSV utilization 
  
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
  
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
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The subsea market 
Subsea utilization is illustrated in figure 3-21. Utilization for DSVs dropped to 77% in 2010, but utilization 
from 2010 and onward is expected to improve. Utilization for ROVSV has been more volatile, and 
improvements are not expected before 2012. The growth in demand and supply has been especially high 
for ROVSV. From 2004 to 2014 the average expected growth rate in demand is 15.7%. 
Figure 3-21: Subsea utilization, DSV and ROVSV  
 
Figure 3-22: Subsea utilization, PLV 
Supply for PLVs has continuously 
increasing over the recent years 
and is expected to stabilize at 
around 150. Utilization has been 
between 65-75% and is expected to 
be at the high end of this interval in 
the coming years. 
 
 
 
  
  
Source: ODS- Petrodata 2010 
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3.4.4 Rate Market 
Rates reflects the balance between demand and supply (Stopford 2009) at any given time 
period and can be seen directly through the volatile spot day-rates. Spot day-rates reflect the 
marginal balance between demand and supply. Term day-rates are based on future expected 
spot day-rates for a given period which are reflected through the balance between demand and 
supply. This is explained in chapter 2.1.3. 
The North Sea (NS) spot development is the only well functional spot market in world. The OSV 
companies aims to secure long term contracts, but they want to be exposed to the spot market 
in the NS to exploit spikes. Many vessels that have not secured contracts will operate in the NS 
spot market. The development in the NS provides information about international spot and 
term day-rates. The NS market have unanticipated spikes due to unanticipated tightening in the 
market. This applies mostly to AHTS vessels, but also to PSVs. Average day-rates for AHTS 
20,000+ BHP was NOK 100,000 in Q4 2009 and reached NOK 1,000,000 in June 2010 and then 
plumped down to NOK 150,000 in July 2010 (DnB NOR Markets 2010). The NS spot day-rates 
have declined in line with the overall international rates and are expected to improve in line 
with better market conditions. Late 2009 and early 2010 are presumably were NS spot day-rates 
hit bottom levels (ODS-Petrodata 2010). ATHS term day rates were around NOK 100,000 for 
AHTS <18,000 BHP and around NOK 50,000 for PSV <3,000 DWT. Rates were higher for stronger 
and larger vessels. During 2010 the term day-rates for AHTS and PSV has improved. Many 
newbuilds entering the NS market has not secured contract and could lead to a slower upturn 
for the term and spot day-rates in the NS compared to international term day-rates.  
Expected rates 
Expectations for future day-rates have an upward trend, which correspond to improvement in 
the balance between demand and supply. In figure 3-23 we can see that there is a upward trend 
for every segment. For low range AHTS (<10,000 BHP) and low range PSV (<2,000 DWT) there is 
limited growth expectations in spot day-rates. 
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Figure 3-23: North Sea spot day-rates 
 
In figure 3-24 we can see that growth in term day-rates are weaker. Significant improvements in 
the rates are not expected before late 2011.   
Figure 3-24: North Sea term day rates 
 
Term day-rates for different segments within AHTS vessels and PSVs varies in different regions. 
The rates in Brazil are higher than in the North Sea region. Reasons for the difference can be 
that demand has grown faster than supply and also the operating costs level is higher. Oil 
companies in the North Sea region indicate that they will implement cost control that will 
probably have a negative effect on spot and term day-rates. Demand and supply fluctuate, and 
Source: DnB NOR Markets 2010 
Source: Arctic Securities 2010 
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in some regions local content hinder offshore service companies to relocate vessels in the short 
term.  
If we look at the average annual global day-rates illustrated in figure 3-25 we can see that rates 
started to decrease in 2008. Term day-rates came down significantly during the economic 
downturn, but are now showing an upward trend as discussed above. The development in rates 
is correlated with the oil price which is the most important contributor to E&P spending 
discussed in chapter 3.1.2.  From figure 3-25 we can see the correlation between the oil price 
and rates. In 2010 the oil price and the rates have improved.  
Figure 3-25: Global annual average oil price and day-rates by segments  
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
 
Demand has grown rapidly the last decade and supply has followed. The resent recession led to 
decrease in demand for the offshore service vessels while supply continued to increase. The 
supply increased because supply is difficult to adjust. The lagged effect of supply lead to an 
adjustment period before supply meets demand. We believe that rates will see improvement in 
most regions in late 2011 along with improved balance between demand and supply. 
3.4.5 Asset prices 
Asset price movements are correlated with rate movements and utilization. Rates and asset 
prices were relatively high around 2001(Arctic Securities 2010). Rates declined slightly during 
the next couple of years and then started to climb sharply in 2004. Rates were at their peak in 
late 2007 and early 2008. Asset prices followed this development and were high in the same 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
U
SD
 p
er
 d
ay
PSV less than 2,000 DWT
PSV 2,000,3,000 DWT
PSV 3,000+ DWT
AHTS <10,000 BHP
AHTS 10,000+ BHP
Oil Price
 Ch
ap
te
r:
 3
 
Th
e 
M
ar
ke
t 
6
2 
 
periods shown in figure 3-26. Rates have declined sharply since then along with asset prices, but 
has recently been flattening out and started to improve. 
Figure 3-26: Second hand OSV values 
 
3.4.6 Conclusion 
If we relate to the short term offshore service cycle described in figure 3-18, the peak was in 
2008 where offshore oil companies made large profits. Then the financial crisis came, where the 
oil price, rates, utilization and asset prices dropped sharply. There are still risks in the market, 
but it seems to be improving and that we are in an upward trend.  
As we discussed earlier the OSV/Rig ratio is expected to see improvement late in 2011. An 
oversupply situation with pressure on utilization and rates are expected to continue for roughly 
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a year. Improvements are not expected before late 2011. Demand growth will then increase 
with rigs entering the market and the supply growth is expected to dampen.  
Table 3-11: OSV to offshore rig ratio 
Table 3-11 show DnB NOR Markets 
expectations for the coming years. 
The rig fleet is expected to have a 
higher growth rate than the OSV 
fleet from 2011.  
Utilization for high end AHTS and PSV are expected to improve in 2011 with a slight increase. 
DSV and PLV utilization is also expected to have a slight increase in utilization, while ROVSV 
utilization is expected to increase at a higher rate. Day-rates have already seen improvement, 
and the trend is expected to continue. Asset values follow the development in rates.  
 
The prospect for the market in which DOF operates looks promising. Rates, utilization and asset 
prices will see improvement after the large numbers of vessels ordered has entered the market 
and demand has picked up. Different segments within the OSV and subsea market have 
different prospects as we have discussed in this chapter. We believe the overall OSV and subsea 
market will improve in late 2011. 
  
Growth OSV fleet Rig fleet 
05-09 49% 18% 
2010e 17% 9% 
2011e 4% 5% 
2012e 1% 3% 
Source: DnB NOR Markets 2010 
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4 Competitor Analysis 
A competitor analysis is important to show if DOF has any competitive advantages compared to 
the competitors in DOF’s segments. The offshore supply market is a fragmented market, with 
141 companies owning large supply vessels. There are 36 companies owning 10 vessels or more, 
including new builds, controlling around 75% of the total fleet. We have decided to limit the 
scope of our analysis and focus our attention to the main Norwegian peers listed on OSE. It will 
make it easier to compare market values, since they are traded at the same exchange. This will 
imply that the same investors are present and values should then reflect the differences 
between these companies if the liquidity of the stocks is high.    
 
We will show the differences in the fleet, strategy, and financials to better understand the 
market structure. The market structure of the regions of operation is different and will affect 
the competition as described in chapter 2.1.1. The North Sea is the only well function spot 
market and the market structure can be described as monopolistic competition. There are many 
charterers and charters, and low barrier for entry or exit. The difference between the North Sea 
and for example Brazil where DOF has a strong presence is that the Brazilian market is more 
regulated. There are high barriers of entry because of the nature of local content, and there are 
fewer charterers. The Brazilian market structure is better described as an oligopoly, and we will 
show that DOF has a competitive advantage in Brazil.         
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4.1 Norwegian peer fleet 
To start off a presentation of the Norwegian peer’s fleet is presented below. 
Table 4-1: Fleet composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From table 4-1 we get a clear picture of the fleet owned and operated by DOF and the 
Norwegian peers. In the OSV segment, Farstad is the largest with a fleet of 56 vessels under 
operation. DOF has a fleet of 43 OSVs and is the second largest, with Solstad Offshore and Deep 
Sea Supply trailing behind. DOF is the 7th largest high end OSV operator in the world as of today, 
as shown in figure 4-1. 
Figure 4-1: Companies controlling PSV > 2,000 DWT, AHTS > 10,000 BHP 
 Farstad Havila Solstad Deep Sea Siem Eidesvik DOF 
PSVs 24 13 8 9 14 12 20 
AHTSs 32 10 23 21 10 0 23 
Subsea vessels  2 4 18 0 6 4 25 
Others 0 2 0 0 15 8 0  
Total 
 
Of which are new builds 
 
Contract Coverage 2010  
Contract Coverage 2011  
58 
 
0 
 
68% 
58% 
29 
 
4 
 
86% 
69% 
49 
 
3 
 
72% 
57% 
30 
 
6 
 
61% 
41% 
45 
 
11 
 
74% 
72% 
24 
 
2 
 
93% 
40% 
68 
 
17 
 
95% 
68% 
Source: Company reports, compiled by authors 
 
Source: Prospectus DOF ASA 2009 
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All of the main Norwegian OSV operators have a fleet composition which is classified in the high 
end segment, and figure 4-1 displays the worldwide high end OSV fleet by each company. We 
can see that Tidewater and Edison Chouest are the largest operators with around 85 high end 
OSV vessels, which is twice the size of DOF’s OSV fleet.   
In the subsea market, DOF is the one of the leading operator with a fleet of 25, including 
newbuilds. The only Norwegian OSV operator that is close to this scale is Solstad Offshore with a 
subsea fleet of 18. However the subsea vessels in DOF’s fleet are more highly specialized and 
newer. 
Figure 4-2: Top 10 Subsea Vessel Owner by Fleet size 
Figure 4-2 shows that by number 
of vessels, DOF will be the second 
largest operator of subsea vessels 
in the world by 2012. We can 
however not classify the pure 
subsea companies in the same 
scale as DOF because they are 
operating as large independent 
subsea operators, with a wider 
aspect. DOF has started to take 
on more subsea project work, and the projects are more in line with the operations of these 
companies. DOF is trying to diversify itself from the other Norwegian OSV operators, with its 
large extended focus on subsea.  
The current average age of DOF’s fleet is only 6.5 years, which is very low. The average age for 
the OSV world fleet is approximately 13 years and the subsea fleet is 19 years. The Norwegian 
peers also have a relatively new fleet, but with an average that is slightly higher than DOF’s. One 
of the advantages with new vessels is that they are more fuel efficient, larger and stronger in 
terms of brake horse power, decks pace and accommodations. This is very important because 
new vessels will soon be operating in deeper waters, requiring more BHP and bigger cranes. It is 
 
Source: DOF ASA Overview 2010 
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also important to have large deck space for equipment, and accommodations for crew and 
engineers.   
4.2 Strategy differences 
DOF`s strategy is to secure long term contracts for their OSV and subsea fleet. This is important 
to service their high debt levels. DOF has the majority of their vessels on long-term contracts 
with major clients such as StatoilHydro, Shell, Total, Halliburton, Chevron, Petrobras, Technip, 
and Acergy/Subsea7.  
The contract coverage for DOF is the highest in the industry, with a historic rate of utilization of 
95%. The contract coverage presented in table 5-1 includes options for peers, while for DOF the 
contract coverage only include firm contracts. We can see that the contract coverage is even 
higher when we have not included options for DOF in 2010. With next to no spot exposure, DOF 
has focused on long term contracts, which differs from some of the competitors. Deep Sea 
Supply is one of the companies with the highest spot exposure amongst the peers, and will at 
times profit from peaks in rates, but certainly derive higher risk from the spot exposure. 
All the Norwegian OSV operators charter out vessels with full marine crew to the charterers, 
while Deep Sea Supply has decided to outsource their crew. Deep Sea Supply can hire crew 
when needed, but they lose the opportunity to train their own crew. This can be a cost 
advantage because Deep Sea Supply has no crew expenses when the vessels are not in 
operation.  
We have mentioned that Solstad Offshore is the closest competitor to DOF in the Subsea 
market for Norwegian peers, but they differ. While Solstad charters out vessels with marine 
crew, DOF has the ability to offer engineering capabilities with the vessels. Engineering 
capabilities involve highly qualified personnel like ROV operators, divers, and geologists. This 
can serve as an advantage when competing for a contract. DOF can charge higher rates when 
engineering capabilities are involved.  
The area of operations is mostly the same for all of the Norwegian peers. DOF has the largest 
fleet of Brazilian built offshore vessels, which is considered a major benefit when operating in 
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the growing Brazilian market driven by the preference for local built tonnage. DOF has a 
competitive advantage due to the circulation rules, as described in chapter 1.5.2. Petrobras 
offers long-term contracts with high rates, and DOF has already received several large contracts 
with Petrobras. The announced large projects in Brazil will form a solid platform for further 
growth. 
4.3 Financials 
By focusing our attention to the financial aspects of the competitor analysis we will see that 
there are large differences between DOF and their Norwegian peers. 
4.3.1 Operating margins 
Figure 4-3: EBITDA margin Norwegian peers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EBITDA margin of the OSV operators, presented in figure 4-3, show that DOF has had a 
falling EBITDA margin and that that they have a considerable lower margin compared to their 
Norwegian peers. While most of the operators have a margin of about 50%, DOF’s margin has 
dropped to around 30%. The reason for this is because much of the operation costs are 
contributed to the subsea operations. While DOF’s OSV operations return an EBITDA margin of 
around 40%, the subsea operations has a lower return. An 
illustration on the operational elements of subsea 
operations and the returning EBITDA levels are presented in 
the table to the right. The illustrated levels show that while 
 
Source: Company reports, compiled by authors 
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Engineers 
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Source: Compiled by authors 
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the vessel charter has a 50% EBITDA, the other operating elements only return 10-15%, which 
will in turn give a total EBITDA margin of around 30%.The subsea  segment accounted for 67% of 
DOF’s revenues in 2009, and will therefore press down the total EBITDA for DOF.  
Another aspect of the lower EBITDA levels, are that DOF has a large share of their fleet 
operating in Brazil, where OPEX levels are higher. This will be discussed in chapter 5. 
Figure 4-4: EBITDA margin large subsea operators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If we compare the EBITDA level of DOF to the larger subsea operators, we can from figure 4-4 
see that DOF operates with a higher EBITDA margin than these operators. In the subsea 
segment the margin is not higher than 20% for Subsea 7/ Acergy, while Technip has around 
14%.  
4.3.2 CAPEX and Debt 
DOF has a large newbuilding program with 17 vessels to be delivered, mostly AHTSs. Other 
operators that also have a large new building program are Siem Offshore and Deep Sea Supply. 
It is common practice to finance newbuildings with debt. DOF has with the newbuildings in 
Brazil, secured very attractive financing at low fixed rates over 17 years. The Brazilian loans can 
be seen as a competitive advantage, and constitute a large part of DOF’s debt. 
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Table 4-2: Remaining CAPEX and debt to EBITDA ratio for main Norwegian peers 
 
Table 4-2 illustrates the remaining CAPEX levels and the net debt to EBITDA ratio for DOF`s 
Norwegian peers. This ratio can tell us something about the ability to service loan obligations. 
We can see that Farstad has a very low ratio, and no remaining CAPEX. While most of DOF`s 
Norwegian peers have a ratio of around 7-8, the CAPEX is quite different. DOF has the largest 
newbuilding program, and also one of the largest debts to EBIDTA ratios. We know that the 
contract coverage is very high, and even newbuilds have secured long term contract coverage. 
DOF has a backlog of 21 billion as of Q2 2010, not including options. DOF should have no 
problem servicing the debt. The growth in debt due to the remaining CAPEX will be 
compensated with growth in EBITDA, and the NIBD/EBITDA ratio will fall already in 2011 if our 
expectations are correct.     
4.4 Conclusion on competitor analysis 
DOF has a younger fleet than their Norwegian peers, and have secured the highest contract 
coverage in the industry. DOF has with their large subsea exposure tried to diversify themselves 
from their peers. This will make the peer view less relevant, since none of the companies that 
we have mentioned have the same fleet composition.  
DOF has the largest fleet of Brazilian built offshore vessels, which is considered a major benefit 
when operating in the growing Brazilian market, driven by the preference for local built 
tonnage. With many vessels under construction, DOF will be able to import more tonnage under 
Brazilian flag. They will be able to take on new long term charters expected to be tendered in 
near future. DOF has high debt and remaining CAPEX compared to their peers but has long term 
contract coverage secured. 
As of Q2 2010 Farstad Havila Solstad Deep 
Sea 
Siem Eidesvik DOF 
NIBD/EBITDA 
Remaining CAPEX (MNOK) 
2.62 
0 
7.90 
600 
4.49 
450 
7.42 
2 960 
8.03 
3 920 
7.01 
440 
7.90 
9 971* 
Source: Company reports, compiled by authors 
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The competitive advantage in Brazil is “short term”, since competitors can build in Brazil over 
time. Deep Sea Supply has 1-2 vessels under construction in Brazil. Farstad Shipping and Deep 
Sea Supply have both received lucrative deals with Petrobras in Brazil recently. But it take 2-3 
years to construct a vessel after ordering it, if there is capacity at yards, and we know that the 
current yard capacity in Brazil is limited. Brazil have however plans to expend their yard 
capabilities.  
Regulations in Brazil can also shift, and the benefit from local content can be lifted. This will 
open for more international companies to enter the market, and DOF will lose their advantage.  
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5 Financials 
 To perform a valuation we need to analyze DOF’s financials which will serve as the basis for our 
forecast for future values. Chapter 5 will provide readers with a thorough discussion on issues 
related to DOF’s financial position and to the right is a summary of issues that will be discussed. 
First we will present an analysis of past reported 
income statement (P&L) and balance sheets, and 
then we will forecast the progress for the next 4-5 
years. With DOF`s resent high growth, going back 
further than 2-3 years will not be relevant for 
analysis of the future. In shipping the past return 
and accounting results may be of limited use for 
future projections, because of high volatility in 
earnings and values. 
Table 5-1: Recent developments in 2010 for DOF 
 
Table 5-1 is presented to show news released to the market from DOF ASA in 2010. Highlighted 
in bold, we would like the reader to get a picture of recent contract renewals and new contracts 
Revenues 
OPEX 
Depreciation/write downs 
Net financial 
Taxes 
Net Profits 
EBITDA projection for Cash Flow 
Assets 
CAPEX 
Debt 
Working Capital 
Cash flow projections 
Risk management 
Adjustments to accountings 
Date 
2010 Announcements 
23.feb Extension of contracts with Shell UK - 1 year - Skandi Foula and Rona 
23.feb Charter contract 1+1 year with OGX - Skandi Emerald 
07.apr Private placement DOF Installer - 150 million 
10.mai Long term bareboat charter with Seaforce in Australia - 4 to 6 years - Skandi Bergen  
18.mai 3 year contract with Subsea7 - 3x 1 year option - Skandi Neptune 
21.mai DOF Subsea Norway awarded Diverless Frame agreement and First call-out by ConocoPhillips 
10.jun Two 4 year contracts with Petrobras in Brazil - Skandi Giant and a similar vessel 
25.jun DOF Subsea acquires Subsea engineering and construction business in Australia - SWG Offshore 
12.jul New unsecured bond issue for DOF ASA - NOK 950 millon, maturity July 2013, bought back old bond loans 
02.aug Four 8 year contracts for 4 large AHTS with Petrobras - estimated gross revenue of NOK 5.2 billion 
11.aug Two new AHTS to be built in Brazil - AH11 design 
25.aug Long term contract with Total in Argentina - 15 year duration - Skandi Patagonia 
26.aug Geotechnical Survey for Shtokman - Geobay 
29.sep Extension of contract withStatoil - 2 years - Skandi Stord 
01.okt New unsecured bond issue for DOF Subsea - NOK 750 millon, maturity April 2014, bought back old bond loans 
18.okt 3 long term charter contracts with Petrobras, ROV support - 5 years, estimated gross revenue of NOK 2 billion 
18.okt Norskan listing postponement until 2011 
19.okt DOF Subsea Norway awarded a survey contract by Statnett, survey of Hardanger Fjord 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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that were obtained during 2010. The contracts will illustrate recent growth in DOF through 
contracts that will be the driver for future growth. We have also included news that relates to 
financing of the recent growth in DOF`s fleet, refinancing of bond debt and sale of vessels.    
5.1 Revenues 
Revenues have over the last couple of years grown significantly. DOF`s historical revenues and 
revenues per segments of operations is presented below.  
Figure 5-1: DOF ASA historical revenue and revenues pr segment 
 
Figure 5-1 shows growth in revenues for DOF from 2004 to 2009. We can see that revenues 
have more than quadrupled over 5 years, and while the PSV and AHTS revenues have been 
relatively stable, revenues from subsea operations have increase significantly and represent 
most of the revenues contributed to DOF. EBITDA margins for DOF have in the same period 
fallen dramatically, from 54% in 2004 to 29% in 2009.  
5.1.1 Segments 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the developments in revenues and EBITDA margins contributed by OSV`s 
and subsea vessels to DOF. We will now analyze the developments in historical revenues for 
each segment and indicate developments for the future. 
Source: DOF ASA  annual reports  
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Figure 5-2: Revenues and EBTIDA margin DOF segments 
 
PSV 
Revenues from PSVs have almost doubled from 2004 to 2009, and the number of PSVs in 
operations has varied from 14 to 18 as illustrated in figure 5-3.  
Figure 5-3: Number of vessels in operation, end of year 
PSV rates reached an all time high 
in 2007 and have declined 
significantly since. The reasons are 
mainly the financial crisis and the 
increasing newbuildings entering 
the market. DOF has 2 newbuilds to 
be delivered in 2011 and they have 
secured long term contracts at very 
good rates. Vessels already in 
operation have very good contract coverage which is presented in appendix B. DOF has next to 
no spot exposure with only one vessel in the spot market. 
AHTS 
The number of AHTS vessels in operation has been steady at 7-9 vessels since 2004 as illustrated 
in figure 5-3. Rates increased leading up to the financial crisis in 2007, and have since declined. 
Source: DOF ASA annual reports 
 
Source: DOF ASA annual reports, compiled by authors 
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DOF has a large newbuilding program for high end AHTSs which will create an increase in 
revenues from the AHTS segment. DOF has long term contract coverage for all AHTS vessels in 
operation. Norskan’s 4 newbuildings in Brazil have secured 8 years contracts with Petrobras, at 
significant levels as shown in table 5-1. DOF just ordered one new AHTS with the same design as 
two of the vessels already under construction in Brazil and we can expect day rates at same 
levels.  With newbuilds under construction in Brazil DOF will be able to import more DWT under 
Brazilian flag.  
Rates for AHTS vessels and PSVs have recently showed signs of improvement as discussed in 
chapter 3.4.4. In chapter 3.4.3 we found that utilization for high end vessels in the OSV segment 
will fall until the end of 2011 as more vessels are delivered. This will put pressure on rates in 
most areas of the world, but as mentioned, DOF has secured many long term contracts beyond 
2011. 
Subsea 
Revenues from the subsea segment have increased extremely, and constitutes of 67% of total 
revenues for DOF in 2009. The increase in revenues is attributed to many vessels coming into 
operation. From 6 vessels in operation in 2003, the number has increased to 22 at end of 2009 
as presented in figure 5-3. Rates from subsea operations are more difficult to analyze, since the 
contracts differ from the PSV and AHTS term charter contracts. 
Subsea vessels operate on term charter contracts or on project 
basis. As described in chapter 4.3.1, the project base contract is 
paid with a day-to-day rate depending on what operations are 
undertaken. An example is illustrated to the right and show that the vessel charter might count 
for only 50% of revenues earned with the project, and the remaining revenue earned is based 
on what equipment and workforce is used.  DOF can provide engineers, ROVs, and dive teams 
according to the charterers requirements. DOF also charterers out vessels with crew at standard 
term-charter contracts, and the charterer provide the remaining crew and equipment at own 
costs.  
 Day rate (TNOK) 
Vessel charter 
ROV rental 
Engineers 
500.000 
300.000 
200.000 
Total day rate 1.000.000 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Chapter 3.4.3 showed that the utilization for subsea vessels will not be impacted in the same 
way as the OSVs. Attribution of old vessels can help to improve the utilization further.  We 
therefore believe that rates from the subsea segment will be promising. 
5.1.2 DOF`s contract coverage 
The contract coverage of DOF`s fleet is presented in appendix B. Specifications and classification 
for each vessel, the charterers and areas of operation are also presented in appendix B. 
From the fleet coverage we find that most of the operational fleet has long term contract 
coverage through 2010 and will not have to renew contracts before the end of 2011. In 
addition, the firm contracts have extendable options added. Historical utilization for DOF’s fleet 
has been very high, around 95% on average. Vessels under construction in DOF’s subsidiaries 
Aker DOF Deepwater and DOF Installer have not secured contracts yet, but we assume that 
contracts for the high end newbuilds will be in place before construction is finished. 
5.1.3 Geographical areas 
The geographical area of operations, based on the location of charterers, will impact day-rates 
for vessels. While the North Sea is often used as an indicator for spot rates and term charter, 
operations in Brazil have showed higher day-rates and OPEX levels. DOF operates the largest 
OSV and subsea fleet in Brazil through the Brazilian company Norskan. 
Figure 5-4: DOF’s revenue by operating areas 
Figure 5-4 illustrates that the North 
Sea and West Africa operations have 
contributed most to total revenues 
in the past, but the Brazilian 
operations have increased its 
contribution over the years. The 
trend will increase significantly as 
newbuilding are delivered and as 
DOF might transfer more vessels 
 
Source: DOF ASA annual reports, compiled by authors 
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Th
ou
sa
nd
 N
O
K
Eurpoa/west africa Australasia America/wordwide
 Ch
ap
te
r:
 5
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
 
7
7 
 
from operations in the North Sea to Brazil. The signaled increase in E&P in Brazil by Petrobras 
will contribute to increase the revenues from this area of operations. Petrobras have announced 
tenders with an increase of 146 vessels over the next 5 years.   
5.1.4 Revenue projection 
Based on recent massive growth in DOF’s fleet and vessels to be delivered we can expect a high 
growth in revenues over the next years. DOF has a contract backlog of NOK 21 billion, and NOK 
34 billion including options. Combining DOF’s current situation with the market projections in 
chapter 3 and competitor analysis in chapter 4, we will have a solid basis for making forecast on 
revenues for the next five years.  
In appendix A we have outlined a model for revenue projections over the next 5 years. A 
summary of results from the model is presented below in table 5-2. The model will be applied to 
incorporate factors that contribute to the revenue developments. 
Table 5-2: Revenue projection model summary 
 
The model shows that deliveries of new vessels coming into operation will be the main driver 
for growth in revenue. DOF has 17 newbuildings that will be delivered over the next 3 years. 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Revenue Projections Effects on Revenue
95%
AHTS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Market Utilization 68% 55% 56% 57% 59% 63%
DOF Utilization 99% 95% 93% 84% 77% 75% 1.92% 2.02% 4.44% -0.70% -0.27% -0.16%
Index inflation 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%
Rate development 0% -1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.00% -1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
new vessels 1 3 7 3 1 0 12.50% 33.33% 58.33% 15.79% 4.55%
17.92% 37.85% 67.27% 19.59% 8.77% 4.34% 17.92% 37.85% 67.27% 19.59% 8.77% 4.34%
95%
PSV 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Market Utilization 78% 67% 68% 69% 71% 75%
DOF Utilization 98% 96% 94% 90% 86% 86% 0.86% 0.37% -0.12% -0.18% -0.19% -0.02%
Index inflation 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%
Rate development 0% -1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.00% -1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
new vessels 1 1 0 0 0 0 5.56% 5.26%
9.91% 8.13% 4.38% 4.32% 4.31% 4.48% 9.91% 8.13% 4.38% 4.32% 4.31% 4.48%
90%
Subsea 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Market Utilization 71% 71% 73% 77% 80% 84%
DOF Utilization 91% 94% 94% 93% 93% 94% 0.56% 0.76% 0.37% -0.05% 0.04% 0.02%
Index inflation 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%
Rate development 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
new vessels 1 1 1 0 0 0 4.55% 4.35% 4.17%
9.61% 9.61% 9.03% 4.45% 4.54% 4.52% 9.61% 9.61% 9.03% 4.45% 4.54% 4.52%
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Many of the vessels under construction have secured long term contracts at lucrative rates. The 
vessels will certainly boost the revenue stream when vessels start operating. For vessels already 
in operation the contract coverage is very high. DOF will not need to renew contracts before 
well into 2011. Chapter 3 showed that in 2011 utilization is assumed to start rising, and rates 
have already showed some improvements.  
For DOF’s OSV fleet the high contract coverage is expected to be maintained for years to come. 
The worldwide utilization is expected to decrease with only 56% utilization for AHTS in 2011, but 
DOF has contract coverage for most of their OSV vessels beyond this and will need to renew 
contracts when market is expected to improve. DOF can transfer more of their vessels working 
in the North Sea, and other regions, to Brazil. DOF will benefit from the import rules applied to 
vessel owners building vessels in Brazil.   
In the subsea market we expect that utilization will be very high for the entire world fleet in 
years to come. Many new projects that were put on hold due to the financial crisis are starting 
up again, and more subsea installations will be needed due to findings at higher depths. We 
therefore believe that DOF has a unique opportunity to secure future subsea contracts.  
We have to take into consideration the index regulated adjustments to term charter rates as 
mentioned in chapter 1.3. The index regulations will usually vary in line with cost inflation 
assumptions, but will not fully compensate the charter. In the North Sea region the cost 
inflation is estimated to be around 3% p.a., but in Brazil cost inflation assumptions are as high as 
4-5% p.a. We have input 3.5% p.a. in our revenue projection model. Applying the revenue 
model we end up with a result that is presented in table 5-3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ch
ap
te
r:
 5
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
 
7
9 
 
Table 5-3: Revenue projection 2010-2015 
Mil NOK 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
AHTS 710 995 838 438 1 155 787 1 933 273 2 311 976 2 514 750 2 623 971  
PSV 708 954 779 244 842 613 897 552 917 508 957 069 999 985  
Subsea 2 907 327 3 186 592 3 474 450 3 788 312 3 956 815 4 136 581 4 323 492  
Total 4 327 276 4 804 274 5 472 851 6 601 136 7 186 299 7 608 401 7 947 448 39 620 409 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Projections for the next 5 years will represent an estimated doubling of revenues. The revenue 
stream will sum to NOK 39.6 billion over 5 years, and if we compare this to the present backlog 
including options, of NOK 34 billion, we believe that our estimates are a good indicator of the 
massive growth in revenues over the next years.   
5.2 Operating Expenses 
Operating expenses have increased significantly in recent years from NOK 1.7 billion in 2006 to 
NOK 3.1 billion in 2009, and represents almost a doubling of operating expenses. Meanwhile, 
revenues have increased around 44%. OPEX accounted for 57% of revenues in 2006, and 
increased to 71% in 2009. The main driver for growth in expenses was the large increase in 
payroll costs where costs have grown 165% from 2006 to 2009 illustrated in table 5-4.  
Table 5-4: Historic payroll costs and number of man years employed 
 
The number of employees has increased due to the large increase in DOF’s fleet in past years. 
We assume that the number of employees will continue to increase as vessels under 
construction are delivered.  
Operations in the subsea segment has, as mentioned, contributed to a very large part of 
operating expenses with an average of 73% of operating expenses. Subsea operations often 
require the use of expensive equipment and engineers. The costs of these services are very high 
compared to service costs contributed by the OSV fleet. Of the vessels under construction, only 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Payroll cost (TNOK) 
% of income 
Number of man years employed 
274 564 
27.8% 
525 
497 883 
32.1% 
750 
739 470 
26.4% 
984 
1 282 683 
39.0% 
1 027 
1 636 825 
41.2% 
2 300 
1 960 483 
46.0% 
2 722 
Source: DOF annual reports, compiled by authors 
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3 out of 17 vessels are subsea vessels. This will contribute to lower operating expenses from 
subsea operation as part of total operating expenses.  
In Brazil, where DOF has increased its fleet presence, operating costs are higher than in other 
regions. Due to local content in Brazil, DOF’s Brazilian flagged vessels will have to be operated 
by Brazilian crew. There is a shortage of qualified personnel, and they therefore require higher 
wages and training. Many of DOF’s vessels under construction are chartered to operate in Brazil, 
and will contribute to higher operating expenses. Wage inflation is expected to be higher in 
Brazil than other regions, with an expected annual wage increase of 4-5%. Compared to other 
regions where projections are as low as 2-3%. Wage inflation will impact DOF’s operating 
expenses more than their Norwegian peers because of DOF’s large concentration of their fleet 
under operation in Brazil.  
Other operating expenses are mostly contributed to operation of vessels, and costs are 
expected to decrease relative to revenues. When vessels are delivered the average age of the 
fleet is only 6.5 years, and newer vessels are more cost effective to operate.  
Table 5-5: Estimated OPEX levels 
Table 5-5 illustrates the OPEX levels 
that form the basis for future 
projections. In total we assume that 
operating expenses will remain at 
very high levels of revenues over the 
next 2 years, and then start to 
decrease as revenues will grow more than costs. We assume that the percentage OPEX level will 
stabilize at 66% beyond the forecasted period.  
5.3 Depreciation 
Depreciation will not, in general, give a correct picture for the falling value in the period, 
because the accounting lifetime of a vessel is different for the economical lifetime of vessels. 
Vessel values are also very volatile as discussed in chapter 3.4.5. Therefore the book value of 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AHTS 59% 58% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57%
PSV 67% 65% 64% 63% 63% 63% 63%
Subsea 76% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72%
Total 71% 68% 68% 66% 66% 66% 66%
OPEX levels
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vessels is different from the market value. According to accounting rules a vessel should be 
depreciated straight over 30 years. The actual lifetime of the vessels hull is longer, as shown 
under fleet age in chapter 3.2.1 where vessels have been in operation for longer periods. Many 
of the old vessels have been rebuilt using the existing hull, to perform other operations. The 
value of the vessels will not decrease much over time which will be shown in the NAV valuation 
in chapter 6.2.3. 
Depreciation also includes maintenance which is activated when performed. Activated 
maintenance is depreciated over 2.5 years straight in DOF’s accounting. The total maintenance 
has historically been around 1-1.5% of vessel values for the existing fleet. As vessels get older 
they usually require more maintenance and maintenance should in general increase as vessels 
values decrease with time. DOF has indicated that they will continue to order new vessels, and 
the attribution for old vessels will cancel out the effect.   
5.4 Net financials 
Net financials consist of interest income and costs, gain and loss on financial activities, and 
income from minorities. One of the largest financial costs for DOF is naturally the interest costs 
relating to their high debt. In 2008 the interest costs were 633 million and 566 million in 2009. 
The reason for the reduction in interest costs, even though debt increased, was the falling levels 
for 3M NIBOR. DOF has a large floating debt, and the interest costs will be dependent on NIBOR.  
DOF tries to uses interest rate swaps to convert their floating interest bearing debt to fix 
interest. Financial risks will be discussed later in chapter 5.12. We assume interest costs for DOF 
to rise as debt will increase in line with the delivery of their new vessels under construction.  
DOF reports accounting in NOK and a large agio/disago effect has occurred in resent years. 
Agio/disagio is a phenomenon which affects many shipping companies since they report their 
accounting in different currencies than what currency is earned or paid. In 2008 the agio/disagio 
effects led to an unrealized cost of 655 million, and in 2009 an unrealized profit of 758 million. 
DOF has mentioned that they consider USD reporting, which could help to dismiss these effects, 
but DOF has at this point not implemented USD reporting. DOF’s competitors Deep Sea Supply 
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and Siem Offshore reports in USD, and they have no agio/disagio effects on their P&L 
statements. 
5.5 Taxes 
The general tax rate for Norwegian companies is 28% of profits, but shipping companies rarely 
pay 28%. Accounting standards imply that vessels should be depreciated over 30 years straight, 
while the tax authorities use a different approach which leads to differences in the actual tax 
cost. This is referred to as deferred tax differences. Due to deferred tax the actual tax paid is 
sometimes very different from 28%.  
In 2007 a new Norwegian tax tonnage regime was introduced (Ernst & Young, April 2010). 
Companies that qualify include ASA, AS or SE companies. DOF ASA is such a company and the 
qualifying vessels are primarily vessels in international trade carrying passengers and/or cargo. 
In addition, Norway allows auxiliary vessels, such as AHTS, PSV, Seismic etc. The new tax 
tonnage regime includes tax exemption on operating profits and gains on sales. Net financials 
will however be taxed. Tax tonnage will be levied as an object at following rates presented in 
table 5.6. 
 Table 5-6: Tax tonnage levies 
In 2009 DOF paid extra tax due to the new tax law 
because the rules concerning income settlements in 
connection with entry to the regime imply that the 
difference between market values and taxable 
values is taxed, but the extra tax is assumed to be returned later. 
In Brazil where DOF has received highly lucrative deals with Petrobras, tax authorities have 
decided to reinterpret the time charter contract. The ruling was that the contracts did not meet 
the requirements for entering Repetro, a program which suspends federal import tax on vessels 
entirely, and also reduce stat tax levies. Based on this, charters have to pay proportional tax on 
import of 50% of the vessels value, and also pay 1% of that pr month for the duration of the 
 NOK per day 
First 1000 net DWT 
For 1000 up to 10 000 DWT 
For 10 000 up to 25 000 DWT 
For per 1000 DWT above 
0 
18 
12 
6 
Source: Ernst & Young 2010  
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contracts. Market sources are expecting that taxes will be partly compensated by Petrobras, 
until final legislations are in place (Tradewinds 24.9.2010).   
To conclude, there are many tax issues that are not yet resolved and it could impact the tax to 
be paid in the future substantially. We will use 15% as an effective tax, but due to uncertainty 
regarding the effective tax we have also performed a valuation based on pretax cash flow to 
show the final value without tax.    
5.6 Net profits 
Based on discussions above, the reported net profits varies widely mostly due to the net 
financials and taxes. Agio/disagio effects have made a large impact on net profits in the resent 
years. We have therefore decided that we will base our cash flow projections on EBIDTA. 
Estimations on net financials and taxes will only lead to more uncertainty to the valuation.  
Table 5-7: Projected EBITDA 2010-2015 
Mil NOK  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Revenue  4 804 274 5 472 851 6 601 136 7 186 299 7 608 401 7 947 448 
OPEX  3 287 149 3 699 675 4 383 667 4 744 763 5 014 700 5 238 568 
EBITDA  1 517 125 1 773 175 2 217 469 2 441 536 2 593 701 2 708 880 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 5-7 summarizes the results of our analysis and projections of EBITDA. EBITDA increases 
almost 80% over a five period due to high growth in revenues. Consensus amongst leading 
investment houses are that OPEX is lower than our estimates. We will show the impact of 
changes to our estimates in the scenario analysis in chapter 6.4. 
5.7 Assets 
DOF has one of the highest book values of companies listed on OSE. The high book value is 
attributed to DOF`s large fixed assets. The real value of the assets are however quite different. 
The NAV valuation in chapter 6.2 will discuss the real value of the vessels. In theory the value 
should equal the possible cash generated over the vessel`s lifetime or the transaction value in 
the second hand market.  
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DOF’s balance sheet has grown with the resent growth in vessels. In 2007 DOF bought a 
controlling share of DOF Subsea AS and consolidated it 100% into DOF ASA which increased the 
balance sheet significantly.  
5.8 Capital expenditure 
In an analysis of CAPEX it is important to distinguish between replacement and expansion 
investments because replacement investments usually does not increase the possible income 
for the company compared to expansion investments. Expansion investments also indicate a 
different company risk than replacement investments. The separation is important to show if 
fixed or variable cost jumps will occur, and is therefore important for an investor who estimates 
future cash flows.DOF has a large remaining CAPEX for its newbuilding program of 17 vessels.   
Table 5-8: DOF ASA CAPEX program 
 
Table 5-8 shows that DOF has remaining CAPEX of NOK 10 billion, of which NOK 9.5 billion is 
planned to be financed by debt, and NOK 443 million with equity. Remaining CAPEX is actually 
smaller since DOF Subsea is only owned 51%, and DOF Installer is 67% owned by DOF Subsea. 
The actual CAPEX is NOK 8.4 billion, but since these companies are 100% consolidated into DOF 
ASA, 100% will be shown on DOF’s balance sheet.  
 
 
 
 
New builds DOF ASA Group 
01.08.2010  (NOK ’000) 
Project Price Paid in Remaining 
CAPEX 
Financing Equity 
needed 
Sum new builds DOF ASA Group 12 923 638 2 953 059 9 970 579 9 527 920 442 659 
Relative share new builds DOF Group 10 505 716 2 165 999 8339 717 7 752 620 587 097 
DOF ASA owned 
Norskan 
Aker DOF Deepwater (50%) 
DOF Subsea AS (100%) 
DOFSUB (50%) 
DOF Installer (67%) 
553 870 
4 682 275 
855 903 
942 677 
1 562 020 
1 908 971 
106 890 
665 013 
119 560 
272 679 
667 500 
334 357 
446 980 
4 017 262 
736 343 
669 998 
894 520 
1 574 614 
420 000 
3 718 320 
582 500 
600 000 
1 192 800 
1 239 000 
26 980 
298 942 
153 843 
69 998 
-298 281 
335 614 
Source: DOF ASA Overview 2010 
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Figure 5-5: Distribution of Remaining CAPEX 
The distribution of remaining CAPEX shown in 
figure 5-5 is important for valuation. The risk of 
delay in delivery will push the remaining CAPEX 
into the future, and will impact the cash flow. 
Cancelations of newbuilds might occur, but is 
highly unlikely. Based on the present projections, 
DOF will pay the majority of their CAPEX in 2010 
and 2011. DOF has indicated that they will continue to order new vessels to benefit from the 
Brazilian import regulations. We have not incorporated this indication into our projections, since 
it would only be speculation on the cost and financing of the vessels.  
In addition to the newbuild related CAPEX, DOF’s fleet will require maintenance, repair and 
upgrade CAPEX. Historical maintenance has been around 1-1.5% of the vessel’s book value, and 
we have projected 1.5% in CAPEX maintenance in our estimates.  
 
5.9 Debt 
DOF has a very high debt because of debt financing of their major newbuilding program. DOF 
has been able to finance most of their vessels with up to 80-85% in debt financing, and 
therefore have a much higher gearing than their Norwegian peers. Despite DOF`s high debt, 
they have been able to secure long term financing at fixed rates for the newbuilds in Brazil. 
DOF`s Barzilian loans are 17 year loans at a comforting fixed rate of only 5.5% (4.5% + 1 % 
commission rate).  The Brazilian loans compromise much of DOF’s debt. Besides the lucrative 
Brazilian loans, DOF has a large part of their loans with commercial banks and loans guaranteed 
by Norwegian Exportfinans. ExportFinans offers guarantees in connection with Norwegian 
export and investments abroad. 
Bond issues serve as the most expensive financing, and DOF has currently around NOK 3 billion 
in bond loans. DOF is in a process of refinancing bonds with maturity in 2011 with new bonds 
issues at lower rates.  
 
Source: DOF Q2 report, compiled by authors 
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Table 5-9: DOF ASA bond issues  
 
Table 5-9 show DOF`s current outstanding bond loans and we notice that bond loans issued 
during 2009, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, are at very high rates with up to 1150 basis 
points over 3 month NIBOR. The bond loans were issued at a time when companies had 
difficulty getting financing, and if they did, they would have to pay a very high return to the 
lenders. If we compare bond loans issued after the crisis to the bonds issued before the crisis, 
we see that bonds were issued at very comfortable rates of around 100-200 basis points. In 
contrast, the 3M NIBOR was higher before the crisis than what is a reality now, and rates are 
expected to be low until world inflation start to rise.  
The complicated structure of DOF ASA does not show the correct debt level. Subsidiaries are 
100% consolidated on DOF’s balance sheet and DOF actually has a lower leverage and risk 
attributed than what is shown. DOF has secured financing for most of their remaining CAPEX 
program. Unsecured financing is low and with the cash that DOF posses, we believe that DOF 
will have no problem to cover the remaining CAPEX. At end of Q2 2010, DOF had a cash balance 
of NOK 1.8 billion. When vessels are delivered the debt will increase, as the loans are 
transferred over to DOF on delivery. Debt is expected to peak in 2013 with the termination of 
their current CAPEX program, and then decrease. The lucrative contracts secured by DOF for 
some of their newbuildings will generate a cash flow which will cover the debt financing of the 
building cost (80%) after just 4-5 years.  This will create a large cash stream when the vessels 
come into service for DOF.  
 
Source: OSE 2010, compiled by authors 
Interest Issued Maturity Coupon spread Security Currency Amount Remaining
DOF05 PRO FRN 20.12.2007 21.06.2010 NIBOR 3M + 200 SR Unsecured NOK 300 000 000    Matured
DOFSUB01 PRO FRN 09.03.2007 09.03.2011 NIBOR 3M + 130 SR Unsecured NOK 500 000 000    289 500 000     
DOF06 FRN 15.06.2009 10.06.2011 NIBOR 3M + 900 SR Secured NOK 975 000 000    312 500 000     
DOF04 PRO FRN 13.06.2006 13.06.2011 NIBOR 3M + 105 SR Unsecured NOK 400 000 000    400 000 000     
DOFSUB03 PRO FRN 09.07.2009 09.07.2012 NIBOR 3M + 1150 SR Unsecured NOK 500 000 000    500 000 000     
DOF07 FRN 01.10.2010 01.07.2013 NIBOR 3M + 700 SR Unsecured NOK 950 000 000    950 000 000     
DOFSUB04 PRO FRN 01.10.2010 14.03.2014 NIBOR 3M + 700 SR Unsecured NOK 750 000 000    750 000 000     
*Bought back with new loan at NOKm 950. Bought nominal NOKm 662,5 at price 104,33
FRN = Floating Rate Note
*Bought back with new loan at NOKm 750. Bought nominal NOKm 206,5 at price 100
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Development in interest bearing debt is interesting to evaluate against expansions in 
investment activity to analyze what kind of financial risk the investments will bring.  
Figure 5-6: Net debt and debt to asset ratio main Norwegian peers 
 
Figure 5-6 illustrate the increasing debt for DOF compared to Norwegian peers. DOF’s net debt 
has increased at a higher rate than their peers. If we look at the net debt to total assets, DOF’s 
ratio has been fairly stable at around 55% which implies that the extra risk from debt financing 
of the resent growth has not shifted the risk on the creditors entirely.  
Factors that could help DOF with their “leverage problem” are the listing of Norskan, DOF’s 
Brazilian company, at the Brazilian stock exchange. However, DOF recently announced to 
postpone the listing until 2011 (DN 19.10.2010). DOF waits until newbuildings are delivered 
because they want to show strong and stable earnings.  The listing of Norskan can lead to 
significant de-leveraging of DOF ASA. Also DOF Installer recently had a private placement of 
shares to cover building costs which will reduce the need for more loans to finance the 
newbuilding program.  
5.10 Working Capital 
Working capital represents bounded capital that is needed to handle daily operations. Short 
term liabilities require liquid positions that fast can be converted to cover costs. Accounts 
Source: Company Q2 reports, compiled by authors 
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receivables and payables usually increase in line with revenues, and when revenues increase 
there will be an increasing need to bound more cash. We therefore have to incorporate the 
change in working capital into the cash flow because an increase in working capital will reduce 
the free cash flow. 
5.11 Cash Flow projections 
Free cash flow represents the flow of cash generated by a company each year. We have based 
on discussions earlier in this chapter, projected the cash flow for DOF for 2010-2015. Table 5-10 
is a summary of our results. 
Table 5-10: Cash flow projections 2010-2015 
 
DOF’s high remaining CAPEX program results to a negative cash flow the first three years, and it 
is important to draw projections further. We have therefore calculated a cash flow for the next 
5 years, and when all vessels are in operation from 2013 we get a more steady state for 
revenues and OPEX. We have not projected new orders of vessels beyond the remaining 
program.  
5.12 Financial risks 
DOF makes use of financial derivatives in order to hedge certain types of risks to secure their 
cash flow. Risk management is used to control specific areas such as currency risk, interest rate 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Million NOK
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenue 4 804 274 5 472 851 6 601 136 7 186 299 7 608 401 7 947 448
OPEX 3 287 149 3 699 675 4 383 667 4 744 763 5 014 700 5 238 568
EBITDA 1 517 125 1 773 175 2 217 469 2 441 536 2 593 701 2 708 880
CAPEX 4 425 000 4 172 000 2 573 000 1 341 000 0 0
CAPEX Maintenance 211 010 240 690 252 470 251 230 238 110 225 860
Change in WC -406 030 -108 651 -147 587 -62 232 -48 812 -35 571
Free Cash flow -3 524 915 -2 748 165 -755 588 787 074 2 306 778 2 447 448
Tax 528 737 412 225 113 338 -118 061 -346 017 -367 117
Free Cash after tax -2 996 178 -2 335 941 -642 250 669 013 1 960 762 2 080 331
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risk, credit risk, and the use of financial instruments in addition to investment of surplus 
liquidity.  
DOF’s income is mainly in USD, GBP and NOK, while the majority of their operating cost is in 
NOK. DOF is therefore exposed to changes in foreign exchange rates. DOF’s accounting is as 
mentioned in NOK, and changes in exchange rates will affect the reported income as well as 
accounts receivables and accounts payables. In 2009 income in USD and GBP constitute 40% of 
reported turnover. To handle the exchange rate risks DOF attempts to reduce the risk by 
entering into forward contracts and adapting long term liabilities to earnings in the same 
currency. DOF also take out forward cover for future income and commitments.  
Interest risk is attributed to the liabilities with floating rates. To hedge the risk DOF use interest 
rate swaps, where they convert floating rate liabilities into fixed interest rates, and the hedge 
provides more security to the cash flow. DOF`s 2009 report states that an increase/decrease of 
1% in the basic interest rate would represent an increase/reduction in interest costs of NOK 132 
million (DOF 2010). DOF’s Brazilian loans have no interest rate risk as the loans are secured with 
long term financing at fixed rates for the entire duration of the loans.  
Credit risk is assumed to be quite low since the majority of their charterers are national oil 
companies and large caps, and they have sufficient financial capability to meet their obligations. 
Liquidity risk involves the ability to draw on sufficient reserves to meet DOF`s daily operations 
and liabilities. This is handled by securing drawing rights through share issue and marketable 
securities as well as cash. At end 2009, DOF had authority to increase the capital of up to 37.5 
million shares at nominal value of NOK 2. DOF also had cash and cash equivalents of NOK 1.8 
billion in Q2 2010.  
To secure commitments for the newbuilding program DOF has secured bank guarantees and 
guarantees from governments in Norway and Brazil to handle payments to shipyards. We 
therefore conclude that the financial risk and DOF’s capacity for own financing of investments 
are handled satisfactorily. 
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5.13 Adjustments to profit and loss statement 
Based on the numbers incorporated in the P&L statement, we will have to make some 
adjustments, because we only want to use accounting numbers relating to DOF’s operations, 
and not financial accounting numbers. We therefore present the adjustments made in table 5-
10, which we have corrected to get the accounting numbers presented in the above chapters. 
Table 5-11: Adjustments to accounting  
 
Accountings have been removed from the past reported earnings to give a clearer picture of the 
operational side of DOF’s business. We have adjusted revenues by removing gain and loss on 
vessels sold because revenues from these transactions do not represent a normal happening. 
OPEX numbers are adjusted by removing financial items related to pension costs. In total the 
changes are minimal and will not affect the historical analysis. 
5.14 Summary of DOF’s Financials 
DOF has shown high growth in revenues in recent years, and we assume high growth in 
revenues for the next 5 years. Two important reasons for the high growth will be the delivery of 
new vessels and strong contract backlog.  
OPEX have grown massively with the expansion of the fleet and we assume that high OPEX 
levels will continue, but with a declining rate. Debt financing of the CAPEX program have led to 
 
Source: DOF annual reports, compiled by authors 
Notes Items Adjustments 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
5 Operating income Gain / Loss on sale of vessels -29 -163 -88 -317,8 7,9
for 2008 gains consist of sales of skandi navica hercules and geofjord
6 Intangible assets Writedown of goodwill related to CSL LTD 41,5
7 Operating income Writedown on Vessels
Geosunder 9 mill and newbuilding in DOFI 128 mill. 137
Based on broker values, which was smaller than book values.
17 Pensions Remove fiancial posts Capital costs -2,4 -2,5 -4 -4,6 -5,4
Estimated return 2,4 2,9 3,1 4,2 5,7
Estimated variance -0,4 -0,6 -0,9 -1,5 -1,7
28 Payroll costs Payment to auditor: very high in 2009, due to assistance with restructuring -2
Million NOK
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high gearing. DOF have been able to secure the majority of the newbuilding program, and we 
believe that they will have little problem covering the remaining CAPEX program.    
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6 Valuation 
The purpose of a valuation is to find the fundamental value of the company. The fundamental 
value often differs from the value presented in the market through the share price. Reasons for 
the differences can be many things. Low liquidity in the stock, a major share holder, and 
behavioral biases impact how the stock is perceived in the market. The value of the future cash 
flows should represent the “correct price”, but rarely do so.    
Figure 6-1: DOF share price vs. rebased OSEBX, January 1 2009 – November 23 2010 
Figure 6-1 illustrates that DOF’s share 
price has from the start of 2009 
performed worse than the OSEBX 
index. DOF’s share is traded on small 
volumes. DOF has recently announced 
several lucrative new contracts, but 
the share has not performed 
accordingly. The financial crisis 
changed investor biases and investors 
now look for investments with high 
liquidity. Investors want to buy 
instruments that provide the possibility of fast liquidation. The change in investor biases can 
help explain why DOF’s share has not performed in line with the OSEBX index. By performing 
valuations, we will try to uncover why the fundamental values are not represented in the share 
price, i.e. trade at a discount or premium.     
6.1 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
By discounting the cash flow forecast from chapter 5.11 we will arrive at a value for the equity, 
know as market cap, after deducting interest bearing debt. First we have to discuss the discount 
rate that will be used. The discount rate, WACC, represents expected return for the different 
investors based on the capital structure. The WACC rate will also incorporate the time value of 
money.  
 
Source: OSE, compiled by authors 
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6.1.1 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
WACC is the weighted average cost of capital which the shareholders and creditors demands on 
invested capital.  
  ! 	   " 	

 	    
To calculate WACC we need re (cost of equity), rd (cost of debt), t (tax rate), market value of 
equity (MVE) and the value of debt (MVD).  
Cost of equity 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used to estimates the cost of equity, but has some 
weaknesses.   
 #  !  $  
 	 % 
The beta (β), the risk free rate (rf) and the risk premium (RP) have to be estimated. RP is the risk 
premium in the market and is found by taking the expected return in the market less the risk 
free rate. Through extensive studies Damodaran have calculated a geometrical risk premium of 
4.29% based on US Stocks less US Treasury Bonds. The risk premium from Damodaran is based 
on historical premiums from 1928 to 2009 (Damodaran 2010). The risk premiums vary from 
which assumption one makes and the period used. In the period 1900-2006 the average 
premium was 4.7% for the Norwegian stock exchange. The international average premium in 
the same period was about 7% and at NHH it is common to use between 5-7% (Kinserdal 2010). 
We will use a risk premium of 6%. 
Beta reflects the systematic risk of the company and represents the risk which cannot be 
diversified. Systematic risk is dependent on the fluctuations of the market. A company`s 
theoretical beta is therefore the covariance between the return of the company and the return 
of the market (Kinserdal 2010). Beta could in theory be obtained using a regression model and 
regress the daily return on the market against the daily return on the company. This alone does 
however not explain the true systematic risk due to the weaknesses of the model. The model 
does not account for liquidity, changes in capital structure and unforeseen risks. These 
weaknesses can explain some of the discrepancies when estimating a company beta. Since the 
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beta is not 100% reliable when calculating the systematic risk based on historic returns we will 
use a subjective approach where we use an industry beta and adjust for illiquidity, capital 
structure and unforeseen risks. Damodoran derived an unlevered beta of 1.27 and a levered 
beta of 1.45 for the oil fields service and equipment sector (Stern School of Business 2010). We 
will use a beta of 1.4 due to DOF’s high debt. 
For the risk free rate we will use a 10 year perspective. The 10 years Us Treasury bond is as of 
10.11.2010 at 2.66% (Yahoo Finance 2010). The yield curve has a concave structure and is 
expected to reach 4.25% in 2030. The historic risk free rate has been higher and the 10 year US 
Treasure Bond is expected to increase because of higher inflation expectations. The average of 
the last 10 years US risk free rate has been around 4%. The Norwegian 10 year government 
bond is currently at 4%. The rate has been slightly higher in previous years. We will use 4% for 
the risk free rate. When implementing these numbers we arrive at a cost of equity of 12.4% 
Cost of debt 
The average rate of interest for DOF was 6.2% in 2008 and 5.66% in 2009. The cost of debt for 
DOF is dependent on the interbank rates. The rates have fallen in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. We believe that the present interbank rates represented in the market will increase, but 
due to the lucrative rates on the Brazilian loans, we will use 7% as the cost of debt for DOF.  
Capital structure 
The market capital was NOK 3.85 billion as of 30 June 2010 and the book value of net interest 
bearing debt was NOK 13.18 billion. The market capital is then 22.6% of the EV value of the 
company. We believe that this is not the ratio that is best reflected for DOF when we use the 
WACC for discounting future cash flows. The WACC changes continuously as the capital 
structure changes. Because of the high current level of debt we will adjust the market cap ratio 
up to a level that we believe would be more normal for DOF. This is done to base the WACC on a 
fixed level that best reflects DOF in the long run. We will use a market value of equity equal to 
40% of the enterprise value.  
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In chapter 5 we discussed the use of an effective tax rate of 15%, but we will also calculate 
pretax WACC to show the effects on the pretax cash flows. 
WACC 
Based on the discussion above we arrive at a WACC of 8.53% after tax and a pretax WACC of 
9.16%. There is as mentioned much uncertainty surrounding the WACC, and we will perform 
scenario analysis on the changes in WACC in chapter 6.4.1. 
6.1.2 Discount Cash Flow valuation results  
WACC will be used to discount the cash flows which will give us an Enterprise Value. We also 
have to consider a future growth rate in the terminal value that should represent DOF’s ability 
to grow beyond the projection period. To estimate a growth rate above inflation will imply that 
the company will grow eternally and eventually take over the world. We have therefore 
calculated with a growth rate of 3.0%, which would be in line with world inflation. 
Table 6-1: Discount cash flow model results, after tax 
 
Table 6-1 shows that discounted cash flows returns an Enterprise Value of approximately NOK 
20.7 billion. With the current net interest bearing debt of NOK 14 billion, the market cap based 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Million NOK
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenue 4 804 274 5 472 851 6 601 136 7 186 299 7 608 401 7 947 448
OPEX 3 287 149 3 699 675 4 383 667 4 744 763 5 014 700 5 238 568
EBITDA 1 517 125 1 773 175 2 217 469 2 441 536 2 593 701 2 708 880
CAPEX 4 425 000 4 172 000 2 573 000 1 341 000 0 0
CAPEX Maintenance 211 010 240 690 252 470 251 230 238 110 225 860
Change in WC -406 030 -108 651 -147 587 -62 232 -48 812 -35 571
Free Cash flow -3 524 915 -2 748 165 -755 588 787 074 2 306 778 2 447 448
Tax 528 737 412 225 113 338 -118 061 -346 017 -367 117
Free Cash after tax -2 996 178 -2 335 941 -642 250 669 013 1 960 762 2 080 331
WACC 8,53 % 37 619 007  Terminal value
Growth rate 3,00 % -2 996 178 -2 335 941 -642 250 669 013 1 960 762 2 080 331 Cash flow 
-2 996 178 -2 335 941 -642 250 669 013 1 960 762 39 699 339 Total cash flow
Enterprise value 20 831 311                    
NIBD (14 154 000)                  
Market Cap 6 677 311                      
Share price 73,38                             
Share price at discount 58,70                             
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on fundamental analysis comes to approximately NOK 6.5 billion. Outstanding shares of 91 
million shares imply that the price per share comes out to be NOK 71.72. 
Table 6-2: Discount cash flow model results, without tax 
 
Table 6-2 illustrates the result of cash flow valuation without tax. The end result is very similar 
and return a share price of NOK 71.92 compared to NOK 71.72 when we include tax in our 
calculations.  
From table 6-1 and 6-2 we notice that the terminal value, which represents the eternal value of 
the last year projection, is much higher than the enterprise value. The terminal value approach 
represents one of the biggest flaws to the discounted cash flow model, and will be highly 
sensitive to changes in estimates. Scenario analysis of the estimates in the DCF model is 
performed in chapter 6.4. 
The share price that is presented in table 6-1 represents the fundamental value of the 
discounted future cash flow, but since DOF has low liquidity we will have to a apply a discount 
to the share price. Low liquidity and a controlling share holder will represent a discount to 
investors because low liquidity represents a barrier if investors suddenly want to close their 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Million NOK
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenue 4 804 274    5 472 851  6 601 136  7 186 299  7 608 401    7 947 448    
OPEX 3 287 149    3 699 675  4 383 667  4 744 763  5 014 700    5 238 568    
EBITDA 1 517 125    1 773 175  2 217 469  2 441 536  2 593 701    2 708 880    
CAPEX 4 425 000    4 172 000  2 573 000  1 341 000  -               -              
CAPEX Maintenance 211 010       240 690     252 470     251 230     238 110       225 860       
Change in WC (406 030)      (108 651)    (147 587)    (62 232)      (48 812)        (35 571)       
Free Cash flow (3 524 915)   (2 748 165) (755 588)    787 074     2 306 778    2 447 448    
39 731 305  Terminal value
WACC 9,16 % (3 524 915)   (2 748 165) (755 588)    787 074     2 306 778    2 447 448    Cash flow 
Growth rate 3,00 % (3 524 915)   (2 748 165) (755 588)    787 074     2 306 778    42 178 753  Total cash flow
Enterprise value 20 855 738  
NIBD (14 154 000) 
Market Cap 6 701 738    
Share price 73,65           
Share price at discount 58,92           
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positions. A share holder with a controlling stake in the company can hinder other investors to 
affect the company’s decisions. We have implied a discount of 20% from the fundamental 
valuation, and the target price of our DCF valuation will be a share price of NOK 57.38.          
6.2 Net Asset Value Valuation 
Value expectations on vessels will depend on expectations to rates and construction cost 
developments. Values will on the other hand be affected by the balance between demand and 
supply. Over time market participants will not order new vessels unless the market provides an 
expected risk adjusted return on the investment. Vessels don not live eternally and it is 
important to order new vessels. Long term supply will over time adjust to underlying demand 
through investor sentiment. An oversupply situation will in general reduce second hand 
turnover of vessels and therefore increase the uncertainty attributed to vessel values.  
There are many reasons to use NAV valuation with caution. This implies especially to companies 
like DOF who is operating in markets with few vessel transactions and where vessels technical 
specifications and conditions are of crucial significance to vessel values. Vessel value should in 
theory reflect the possible cash flows generated over the vessel`s lifetime, but estimates would 
be highly uncertain with this method. We have therefore used vessel values that were 
presented in chapter 3.4.5 for high end AHTSs and PSVs. By categorizing DOF’s OSV vessels by 
design we can use the second hand transaction values to value the OSV fleet. Age will play a role 
since newer vessels will have better technical specifications, but we do not have enough 
information to incorporate age into our estimates.   
Table 6-3: Newbuilding cost of subsea vessels after classification 
The value of the subsea fleet is more 
difficult to assess since there are next 
to no transactions. We have obtained 
newbuilding cost for various 
classifications of the subsea fleet 
presented in table 6-3 (DOF ASA Overview 2010). We will use building costs to value the vessels 
at CAPEX. Vessel values can be adjusted to represent the real value of the vessels because 
Building cost USD Mill. Number of vessels in DOF 
MSV 
DSV 
Well intervention 
Seismic/survey 
150-200 
150-225 
200-300 
75-125 
13 
6 
2 
4 
Source: DOF ASA Overview, Compiled by authors 
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vessel values are often higher than building costs. We have not incorporated this into our 
estimates. 
6.2.1 NAV results 
Based on estimates of second hand values and building costs we have estimated a total vessel 
value for DOF’s fleet to be NOK 31 billion, including vessels under construction. 
Table 6-4: NAV valuation results 
Table 6-4 show the result of 
our NAV valuation, and the 
NAV is calculated to be NOK 
6.1 billion. NAV per share is 
calculated to be NOK 67. 
DOF’s own estimate on the 
fleet value, without 
newbuilings, is NOK 20 billion 
(DOF Q3 2010). This is not far 
from our estimate if you add the remaining CAPEX to their numbers. Investment houses have 
very different NAV per share for DOF: Carnegie - NOK 68, Nordea - NOK 82, and Arctic - NOK 75. 
Our values are in the lower range of these estimates, and we might have been too pessimistic in 
our estimates. Vessel values obtained are based on present assumptions, and vessel values can 
be very volatile. Vessel values declined about 25% from a peak at the end of 2007, but have 
started to show improvements in line with rates. In the scenario analysis in chapter 6.4.5 we will 
show how our vessel values will affect the NAV per share value if the vessel values changes. 
6.2.2 NAV discount 
The share price will usually not represent NAV values, but will trade at a discount as presented 
in figure 6-2. The NAV discount varies widely and peaked in Q4 2008, with a discount of as much 
as 65%. Our NAV estimate represents a discount on current share price of 45%.        
 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Million NOK
DOF Supply 5 493      Vessels 31 143    
DOF Installer 1 566      Cash 1 835      
Aker DOF Deepwater (50%) 943         Working capital 417         
DOF Subsea 16 182    Other assets 696         
Norskan 6 960      Assets 34 091    
Vessel value, incl new builds 31 143    Debt 15 274    
Remaining CAPEX 9 971      
Minorities 2 726      
Liablities 27 971    
NAV 6 120      
Shares outstanding (mill) 91           
Nav pr share 67           
 Figure 6-2: DOF’s share price discount to NAV
Stock prices might therefore be above
increase (decrease) (Dahl et al. 1997).
Other factors that can explain the 
controlled by one investor or a group of investors
the value maximization of investors ret
realized, and that long term cash flows do
If a company is priced at NAV, it will
implies that there are no possibilities for arbitrage transactions by buying a control
the company and liquidate the company. 
6.2.3 Long term vessel values 
Supply vessels have over time demonstrated long
hand transaction of old vessels is given in figure 6
 
 
Source: Arctic securities 2010, compiled by 
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Figure 6-3: Demonstration of long-term vessel values 
 
Figure 6-3 shows that vessels that are at the threshold of their economical lifetime threshold (30 
years) still possess value. The value is attributed to the condition of the hull and the equipment 
onboard offshore service vessels. Vessels might have undergone extensive maintenance, and 
we know that many old OSV vessels are sold to be rebuilt as subsea vessels. DOF has rebuilt one 
old PSV to operate as a subsea vessel.   
  
 
Source: Gulfmark Offshore Q2 2010 
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6.3 Peer view valuation 
A peer view valuation will not provide an exact target price like NAV and DCF valuation. Peer 
view valuation will use findings of these valuation methods and other key financial numbers to 
compare the price of a company to their peers. In chapter 4 we discussed that we cannot 
compare DOF to pure OSV operators 100% due to significant subsea content in DOF. A peer 
view valuation will therefore be less relevant. Table 6-5 shows the result of our peer view 
valuation. We have obtained consensus estimates for DOF’s Norwegian peer from various 
investment house reports.  
Table 6-5: Peer view valuation 
 
6.3.1 EV/EBITDA 
DOF is priced very high on the EV/EBITDA multiple because they have a very large part of their 
EV value based on future growth, DOF’s EBITDA does not reflect their potential at the current 
time. DOF`s EV/EBITDA is expected to come down in 2011, shown in table 6-5, and we assume 
that the multiple will fall further once EBITDA increases in 2012 because their EBITDA will 
increase at a higher rate than EV. The same is expected for DOF’s Norwegian peers, but not to 
 
Source: Arctic  Securities 2010, Carnegie 2010, compiled by authors 
Price / NAV
2010e 2011e 2010e 2011e 2010e 2011e 2010e
Farstad 6.8x 6.1x 10x 8x 0.9x 0.9x 0.67x
Havila 8.0x 7.7x 13x 4x 0.6x 0.5x 0.54x
Solstad 7.7x 6.9x 11x 9x 0.8x 0.8x 0.57x
Deep Sea 11.3x 7.4x n.m 5x 1.3x 1.1x 0.65x
Siem Ofshore 11.6x 7.8x 18x 9x 0.8x 0.8x 0.60x
Eidesvik 6.8x 5.5x 9x 5x 0.6x 0.5x 0.63x
DOF ASA 13.6x 10.1x n.m 9.4x 0.6x 0.5x 0.65x
Sector 9.1x 6.8x 10.1x 0.8x 0.6x
2010e 2011e 2012e 2010e 2011e 2012e
10.0x 8.0x 7.1x 18.8x 7.5x 5.4x
EV / EBITDA Price / Earnings Price / Book
DOF ASA, consensus estimates
EV / EBITDA Price / Earnings
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the same extent. We believe that the 2012 multiples will show a much more reasonable 
EV/EBITDA for DOF. 
EV/EBITDA consensus for DOF amongst leading investment houses is lower than our estimates. 
We differ from consensus multiples because we are less optimistic to DOF`s EBTIDA margins. 
While we operate with an EBTIDA margin of 34% in 2012, the consensus is 40%. We have built in 
large OPEX for subsea operations and high OPEX from operations in Brazil.     
6.3.2 Price/Earnings 
Price/Earnings (P/E) is not a god multiple to use when performing a peer view valuation, 
because it is does not take into consideration capital structure, depreciation and financial 
differences between companies.  
DOF is expected to deliver a negative result in 2010 due to large agio/disagio differences. The 
consensus P/E estimate for DOF is 18.8, which is much higher than the sector average. Estimates 
for 2011 and 2012 are more reasonable with 7.5 and 5.4. The entire OSV peer group currently 
trades at high earnings multiples reflecting the expectations of higher future growth.  
6.3.3 Price/Book 
Price/Book (P/B) show the difference between value of book equity and value of equity 
presented through the share price. DOF is priced low on P/B, implying that the equity retained 
on the balance sheet is priced lower than what is presented through the share price. Compared 
to the sector, DOF has a low P/B multiple.  
DOF has a capital structure that is highly leveraged, if unforeseen risks would occur, the 
remaining equity can become worthless. This might explain why DOF is priced low on P/B 
multiples compared to Norwegian peers.      
6.3.4 Price/NAV 
Price/NAV (P/NAV) reflects the discount that we discussed in chapter 6.2.2. The sector is now 
trading at a NAV discount of 40%. Our NAV estimates for DOF showed a current discount of 35% 
for DOF, but as we discussed, our estimates are low compared to DOF’s consensus NAV. A 
consensus NAV for DOF of NOK 75 per share implies a discount of 40% compared to today’s 
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share price of NOK 45 (15 December 2010). The consensus corresponds to the sector average 
presented in table 6-5.  
6.3.5 Conclusion of Peer View analysis 
We note that DOF’s current multiples are high compared to their Norwegian peer due to strong 
growth following a significant newbuilding program. The multiples that we have used are higher 
than the sector average which in general implies overpricing of a company. The relevance of our 
peer view valuation should not impact our conclusion on the target price too much, because 
DOF cannot be compared 100% to these companies. Unless DOF orders many additional 
newbuilds, we believe that DOF’s multiples should come down over time.     
6.4 Scenario analysis 
Values that were discussed above in this chapter are based on estimates, and our estimates 
might not be correct. It is therefore important to perform a scenario analysis to capture changes 
in values by changing our estimates. We will perform a sensitivity analysis of our estimates and 
discuss the results with a range in a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 6-6: Scenario analysis results 
 
Table 6-6 shows the result of the different scenarios, and a discussion on each scenario will be 
presented in this chapter. We notice that the range of the intervals is high which explains how 
sensitive the valuation models are to changes in estimates.  
  
 Original 
DCF 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2  Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 5   
Share price NOK 71.72 -21 to 320 33 to 110  53 to 92 72.81 -38 to 160   
Source: Compiled by authors      
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6.4.1 Scenario 1: WACC and growth rate 
To show what impact WACC and the growth rate have on the calculated share price from the 
DCF valuation we have performed a scenario analysis where we implement a range of 6-11% for 
WACC, and 0-6% for the growth rate. 
Figure 6-4: Result of scenario on WACC and growth rate  
 
We can read from the output illustrated in figure 6-4 that 
with a 95% confidence interval the share price will be 
between NOK -21 and NOK 320. The range is very wide 
and shows that when implying the WACC to discount 
future cash flows we will have to be cautious. We note 
that the mean is NOK 92 which is higher than our original 
estimate. The sensitivity output to the right shows us that 
WACC impacted the share price negative and the growth 
rate impacted positively. Figure 6-5 illustrates the share 
price if we only implement changes to WACC.  
 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Figure 6-5: WACC’s impact on the share price  
 
From figure 6-5 we can read that if 
we input a WACC of 10.25% we 
get a share price of 0 which would 
imply that the company is 
bankrupt, and there is no more 
equity left in the company.   
 
 
6.4.2 Scenario 2: Change in OPEX levels 
By changing the OPEX percentage relative to revenues we can show how OPEX changes affect 
the calculated share price. For AHTS and PSV we have input a range in OPEX levels of 40-70%, 
and in subsea we have a range of 60-85%. The wide range will show the extreme sides of DOF`s 
operations and how it will affect the share price. The results in figure 6-6 show that scenario 2 
does not impact the share price in the same extent as scenario 1. Scenario 2 returns a share 
price range of NOK 33 to NOK 110 with a 95% confidence interval. The mean is NOK 71.83, 
which is just slightly above our estimate in the DCF valuation. 
Figure 6-6: Result of scenario on OPEX levels 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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The factors that affected the share price the most was the 
changes to the final year of our projections, as shown to the 
right. The reason is that the final year will serve as the basis 
for the terminal value. This is where the whole value of the 
DOF lies with the DCF method since they have negative cash 
flows the first 3 years due to the large CAPEX program. 
Change in subsea OPEX levels impact the analysis the most 
because revenues from subsea contribute most to the total 
revenue. By changing the OPEX percentage of revenues 
from the subsea segment will impact the share price 
significantly.  
6.4.3 Scenario 3: Rate development and index regulations to TC 
Scenario 3 is performed to show changes to our revenue projection model, discussed in chapter 
5.1.4. We have performed a scenario analysis on rate development and index regulations to TC 
to see how changes will affect our revenue projections, thereby the share price. We have input 
a range of 2-5% for the index regulations to TC, and a range of -6% to +6% for the rate 
development. The development in rates can be higher, but we believe in a more stable rate 
development than in recent turbulent times.  
Figure 6-7: Result of scenario on Rate development and Index regulation to TC 
 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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The result of scenario 3 provides a share price range of NOK 53 to 92 with a mean of NOK 71.92. 
The mean is very close to our findings in the DCF valuation. The range is narrower than scenario 
1 and 2, which can imply that our model might have a flaw. Changes in rates can impact 
revenues for a shipping company significantly year to year, and our revenue projection model 
should have inflicted a larger change in our calculations. DOF’s vessels are however on long 
term contracts and will not be affected by the rate developments in the short run.   
Figure 6-8: Sensitivity of inputs on Rate development and Index regulation to TC 
 
Figure 6-8 illustrates that change to the 
rate development for subsea 2013 is 
most affected by this scenario analysis. 
The reason is because 2013 is the first 
year where there is no new subsea 
vessels delivered in our estimates, 
shown in table 5-2. With an input of 
changes from -6% to 6% in rates, the 
rate will be the single most important 
factor in 2013 for subsea revenues.        
 
6.4.4 Scenario 4: Scraping of old vessels 
In scenario 4 we will show what impact scrapping of old vessels have on utilization. We will 
illustrate the removal of vessels over 25 years and vessels over the technical lifetime threshold 
of 30 years. This is applied for the high end OSV segment and total subsea fleet to indicate how 
it changes utilization and thereby the calculated share price based on our revenue projection 
model.  
  
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Figure 6-9: Scrapping of midrange and high end AHTSs 
 
From figure 6-9 we can see that eliminating midrange AHTS vessels over 25 years from total 
supply have a big impact on utilization for the AHTS segment. DOF however have just a few 
vessels in the midrange segment. Elimination of high end AHTS vessels over 25 years have 
limited effect. The need for the high end segment is growing with the development with the 
demand for deeper water service. 
Figure 6-10: Scrapping of high end PSVs 
 
Figure 6-10 show the same results as 
for the high end PSVs. Eliminating 
high end PSV vessels over 25 years 
have limited effects on utilization for 
this segment. 
 
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010  
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010 
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Figure 6-11 show that elimination of subsea vessels over 30 years old from total supply have an 
impact on utilization for total subsea supply. ROVSVs are new compared to DSV and PLV. There 
are many old DSV vessels, mentioned in chapter 3.2.1, that are past the 30 year threshold.  
Figure 6-11: Scrapping of subsea vessels 
 
We have incorporated the changes in market utilization into our calculation when applying the revenue 
projection model (Appendix A). The new forecasted market utilization we get when eliminating old 
vessels and everything else being equal, is used to find the share price. The result returns a share price of 
NOK 72.81 which is similar the to our DCF estimate. This again implies that our revenue projection model 
might have flaws, but the changes to market utilization for the different segments are not large enough 
to impact our calculation.   
 
Source: ODS-Petrodata 2010  
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6.4.5 Scenario 5: NAV 
Changes in vessel values will have a significant impact on the NAV valuation. As mentioned in 
chapter 6.2.1, vessel values fell up to 25% during the financial crisis from the peak in the end of 
2007. According to our scenario illustrated in figure 6-12, a decrease of 20% from today’s 
vessels values will lead to a negative NAV per share.  
Figure 6-12: Result of scenario on vessel values 
A 20% decrease imply that the 
underlying values for DOF is less 
than DOF`s debt, and they would be 
in conflict with their creditors. An 
increase in vessel values of 
approximately 15% will bring vessel 
values back to levels shown before 
the financial crisis. DOF’s NAV per 
share would then be NOK 110 
according to the scenario results. 
The NAV valuation is based on current values and the scenario illustrates that if vessel values 
suddenly changed, it will impact our valuation significantly.   
6.4.6 Other Scenarios 
There are also other scenarios that we have not considered but can have an impact on our 
valuation. We will present a discussion on scenarios that might be interesting for readers to 
consider.  
- We have not incorporated the order of new vessels beyond the current newbuilding 
program. If DOF orders new vessels, the CAPEX program will increase and the need for 
extra financing might arise. Revenues and operating expenses from the operation of the 
new vessels will have to be estimated. The cash flow will change because of changes to 
CAPEX, revenues, OPEX and maybe the capital structure effect on WACC. 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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- More subsea project work will increase revenues from the subsea segment. We have not 
incorporated this in our projections because DOF need to secure long term contracts to 
handle the current CAPEX program. Project work is often for shorter periods and will 
therefore not bring the same stability to earnings as long term contracts.  
- The possibility to pay dividends in the future might increase the perception of DOF’s 
stock value and increase the liquidity. Stocks that pay dividends have shown higher total 
return to investors than stocks that don’t pay dividends (DN 16.10.2010).  
- We believe that DOF is currently not a Merger and Acquisition (M&A) target because of 
their large CAPEX program and high debt. When DOF start to generate high positive cash 
flows, DOF might become an M&A target. The process surrounding an M&A process will 
help to realize the underlying values imbedded in DOF. 
- A new financial crisis might occur. A financial crisis will again lead to difficulty acquiring 
financing, and might affect the estimated E&P spending which is the main driver for 
demand in the offshore service sector.     
- “Currency war”. A currency war where USA tries to devalue their currency to make them 
more competitive against China and other Asian countries will affect DOF through the 
exchange rate between USD and NOK. DOF uses NOK as an accounting currency and 
have large revenues in USD.  
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6.5 Conclusion on valuation 
We have used 3 different approaches to find the fundamental value of DOF. The valuation 
methods resulted in different values, and the sensitivity analysis showed that the results can 
change dramatically when we change the inputs to the models. The results of the different 
methods are presented in table 6-7. 
Table 6-7: Results of valuation approaches 
 
The result of the different valuation approaches seem to settle on a share price around NOK 72. 
This share price represents our fundamental value of DOF’s share price today. Today`s share 
price is NOK 45 (15 December 2010). Reasons why there is a discount to the share price might 
be because of low liquidity in the share, and that DOF is owned by one investor with a 
controlling stake in the company. There can also be other reasons why DOF’s share price is 
traded at a discount. Investors might be scared of DOF’s high debt levels. The NAV valuation 
showed that with a drop of 20% in vessel values, DOF’s equity would be worthless. Also investor 
bias affects stocks with low liquidity which we discussed in the start of chapter 6.      
In chapter 6.1.2 we discussed our view of a discount that we will apply to DOF`s fundamental 
value. A discount of 20% gives us a target share price of NOK 58. Compared to today’s share 
price, the result of our valuation implies an upside potential of 29%.  
We believe that DOF’s share price is mispriced at current levels. The stock might be perceived as 
a risky investment because of DOF’s high debt and large CAPEX program. The counterpart to the 
high debt is a large contract backlog, long-term financing for many of the newbuilds and solid 
counterparties.DOF also has a leading position in Brazil through their subsidiary Norskan, and 
extensive subsea exposure. We have a buy recommendation on DOF.  
 DCF 
Valuation 
NAV 
valuation 
Scenario  
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 5 
Share price 
NOK 
71.72 67 -21 to 320 33 to 110 53 to 92 72.81 -38 to 160 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Appendix A: Revenue projection model 
We have produced a model for the revenue projections to incorporate factors that will affect 
the revenues in the future. Factors that contribute to the projections are the market utilization, 
DOF’s utilization, rate development, index regulations to TC, and new vessels coming into 
operations. Projections on these factors will be presented for each of DOF’s segments. 
In order to produce a model on DOF’s utilization we have taken the current utilization, 
represented by contracts in place at end of Q2 2010 for the period 2010-2015, and incorporated 
the market utilization to find the expected total utilization for DOF’s vessels each year in the 
projection period. 
DOF`s Utilizationt = Current utilizationt + ((1 – Current utilizationt) * Market utilizationt * (1 + DOF benefitt)) 
 
We have also incorporated a benefit 
factor, implying that DOF has a benefit 
based on their vessels specifications and 
strategic position compared to the 
overall market utilization. This benefit will however not be for eternity, and we have 
incorporated a falling “benefit” factor for DOF over the projection period.   
The projected utilization for DOF each year will affect the revenue stream based on changes in 
utilization from the previous year. To make this possible we have to state DOF’s utilization in 
2009 of each segment. Historical utilization have shown that for PSVs and AHTSs the utilization 
has been around 90-100%, and we have therefore incorporated that revenues for 2009 are 
based on 95% utilization for these segments. We have likewise based 2009 revenues from 
subsea operations on a utilization of 90%. 
The rate development is dependent on the balance between supply and demand. Negotiation 
power will shift between charter and charterer depending on the balance. When the market 
utilization decreases this implies that the rate development will be negative.  
DOF Benefit 2010 2011 2012 2103 2014 2015 
AHTS 
PSV 
Subsea 
0% 
0% 
0% 
25% 
20% 
12% 
20% 
16% 
10% 
15% 
12% 
8% 
10% 
8% 
6% 
4% 
4% 
4% 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Index regulations on TC contracts will lead to an increase in rates each year equal to the 
developments in operating costs. The developments in operating costs vary depending on 
operational areas. While in the North Sea and the rest of the world, costs have increased around 
3-3.5% pr year, we know that in Brazil these levels are higher. We operate with an operational 
cost development of 5% each year. We have therefore incorporated 4% each year for the 
projection period.     
Vessels coming into operations will, as discussed, be the main driver for growth for DOF. Many 
of these vessels have secured long-term contracts upon delivery. We have incorporated new 
vessels in operation by this formula: 
&' () *+,* - .  / 0*) (,-12&,3+ *4 ()-12 5 	 ' () *3  * **- 	 6780*) (,-12 
Some of the new vessels have secured contracts at much higher levels than contracts that are 
already in place. Because of this and the fact that the new vessels might be more attractive and 
then contribute to higher day rates, we have incorporated a 10% benefit.  
Discussions above lead us to a final formula that will show the development in revenues each 
year: 

(, 9()*3- .   :; ,)<*-:; ,)<*-12 	 
 9()*3-  =9>  ,)*  0-  . ' ()- 
The model implies that rate development, index regulated TC rates, and contribution from new 
vessels will make up the revenue stream developments. The change in utilization will impact the 
revenue development depending on utilization from the previous year.   
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Appendix B: DOF ASA contract coverage 2010-2015 
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Source: DOF ASA Q2, compiled by authors 
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Appendix C: Historical Profit and Loss Statement 
 
  
Source: DOF ASA annual reports 
(Thousand NOK)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sales income 986 207          1 553 188       2 796 410       3 285 576       3 969 672         4 258 507        
Other operating income 18 998            30 379            214 468          168 805          370 050            68 769             
Operating income 1 005 205       1 583 567       3 010 878       3 454 381       4 339 722         4 327 276        
Payroll expenses 274 564          497 883          739 470          1 282 683       1 636 825         1 960 483        
Other operating Expenses 197 614          323 744          979 277          942 472          1 147 178         1 133 137        
Operating Expenses 472 178          821 627          1 718 747       2 225 155       2 784 003         3 093 620        
EBITDA 533 027          761 940          1 292 131       1 229 226       1 555 719         1 233 656        
Depreciation 275 710          356 421          417 010          529 791          643 265            837 214           
Write offs 178 501           
EBIT 257 317          405 519          875 121          699 435          912 454            217 941           
Investemets in subsidiaries /affiliated companies 2 479              64 890            42 681            124 834            191 749           
Finance income 107 160          149 451          340 807          694 309          479 719            485 122           
Unrealized gain/loss on currencies (655 382)          757 611           
Finance costs (205 174)         (300 040)         (554 384)         (773 745)         (984 747)          (647 904)          
Net financial items (98 014)           (148 110)         (148 687)         (36 755)           (1 035 576)       786 578           
Profit before taxes 159 303          257 409          726 434          662 680          (123 122)          1 004 519        
Taxes 6 223              16 530            69 252            440 786          (222 983)          201 478           
Profit for the year 153 080          240 879          657 182          221 894          99 861              803 041           
Other comprehensive income
Currency translation differences 842                   86 771             
Other income and costs 172                 20 936            207 712          47 953            122 300            (16 405)            
Other comprehensive income 172                 20 936            207 712          47 953            123 142            70 366             
Total comprehensive income for the year 153 252          261 815          864 894          269 847          223 003            873 407           
Historic Profit and Loss Statement
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Appendix D: Consolidated Balance Sheet 
 
 
Source: DOF ASA annual reports, compiled by authors 
(Million NOK)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010e 2011e 2012e 2013e 2014e 2015e
Intangible assets 50        366      375       538        628       476        476         476        476         476        476         476        
Fixed assets 4 041   5 631   7 446    11 881   14 788  17 287   21 101    24 069   25 247    25 123   23 811    22 586   
Financial assets 17        4          327       1 410     146       89          89           89          89           89          89           89          
Receivables 249      668      754       1 053     1 436    1 720     1 754      2 048     2 447      2 615     2 747      2 843     
Cash and cash equivalent 928      1 357   1 739    1 860     2 832    2 214     1 424      1 471     1 492      1 850     1 800      2 523     
Total Assets 5 285   8 025   10 641  16 742   19 831  21 785   24 844    28 153   29 751    30 153   28 923    28 517   
Debt to credit institutions (short term) -       473      814       826        1 795    2 128     2 128      2 128     2 128      2 128     2 128      2 128     
Interest bearing debt (other long term) 3 828   5 003   5 646    9 927     10 728  11 371   14 500    17 838   19 182    19 354   18 386    17 467   
Provisions for commitment 189      84        231       636        602       603        590         600        600         600        -         -         
Current liabilities 133      405      659       797        1 206    874        1 105      1 290     1 541      1 647     1 731      1 791     
Equity, incl minorities 1 135   2 060   3 291    4 555     5 499    6 809     6 521      6 297     6 298      6 423     6 678      7 131     
Total Equity and liabilites 5 285   8 025   10 641  16 742   19 831  21 785   24 844    28 153   29 750    30 152   28 923    28 517   
Consolidated Balance Sheet
